Edmund Husserl..from my interest in intersubjectivity/Margith Strand/Fielding Graduate University:) Humanism:)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/Edmund Husserl

First published Fri Feb 28, 2003; substantive revision Fri Jul 6, 2007
Edmund Husserl was the principal founder of phenomenology — and thus one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. He has made important contributions to almost all areas of philosophy and anticipated central ideas of its neighbouring disciplines such as linguistics, sociology and cognitive psychology.

•1. Life and work
•2. Pure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality
•3. Indexicality and propositional content
•4. Singularity and horizon-intentionality
•5. The phenomenological epoché
•6. Local epoché, perceptual noema, hýle and time-consciousness
•7. Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld
•8. The intersubjective constitution of objectivity

(An excerpt from):

2. Pure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality
As a philosophically-minded mathematician, Husserl was interested in developing a general theory of inferential systems, which (following Bolzano) he conceived of as a theory of science, on the ground that every science (including mathematics) can be looked upon as a system of propositions that are interconnected by a set of inferential relations. Following John S. Mill, he argues in Logical Investigations that the best way to study the nature of such propositional systems is to start with their linguistic manifestations, i.e., (sets of) sentences and (assertive) utterances thereof.

How are we to analyse these sentences and the propositions they express? Husserl's approach is to study the units of consciousness that the respective speaker presents himself as having — that he “gives voice to” — in expressing the proposition in question (for instance, while writing a mathematical textbook or giving a lecture). These units of consciousness he labels intentional acts or intentional experiences, since they always represent something as something — thus exhibiting what Brentano called intentionality. According to Husserl, there are non-intentional units of consciousness as well. (He quotes pain as an example.) What distinguishes intentional from non-intentional experiences is the former's having intentional content.