STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYMBOL MODEL FOR COMMUNICATION THEORY: LANGUAGE AS CONSTITUTIVE ARTICULATE CONTACT
John Stewart
Perhaps the most basic structural a priori of communication theory is the distinction between communication and what it is about, between words and the world, between map and territory, between symbol and symbolized. Almost no understanding of communication seems more obvious than that there is a fundamental, ontological difference between communication and its content or subject matter. One of the most prominent manifestations of this structural presupposition is the symbol model, the general characterization of language or communication as a semiotic process centrally involving "signs," "signals," and, especially, "symbols" or "symbolizing." The symbol model is manifested most clearly in the claims that language is "a conventional, arbitrary symbol system" ( Burke, 1978, p. 809; cf. Osgood, 1980) and that "[c]ommunication by means of symbols . . . is one of the singularities of humankind" ( Elias, 1991, p. 4; cf. Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1951; Rommetveit, 1968). This model implicitly or explicitly pervades a great deal of classical and contemporary communication theorizing and research.
But the adequacy and coherence of the symbol model have been directly challenged. For example, Martin Heidegger ( 1971) maintained that although "the entire structure of sign relations . . . has remained the standard for all later considerations of language" (p. 97), "the essential being of language is Saying as Showing," and that "its showing character is not based on signs of any kind" (p. 123). Hans-Georg Gadamer ( 1989a) agreed when he critiqued the semiotic "concept of language that modern linguistics and philosophy of language take as their starting point" because it inadequately captures "the language that lives in speech" (pp. 403-404). He emphasized that from his perspective language "is no longer a system of symbols or a set of rules of grammar and syntax ( Gadamer, 1984, p. 63) and that "as long as [language] is even conceived as a
2 comments:
One of the most prominent manifestations of this structural presupposition is the symbol model, the general characterization of language or communication as a semiotic process centrally involving "signs," "signals," and, especially, "symbols" or "symbolizing." The symbol model is manifested most clearly in the claims that language is "a conventional, arbitrary symbol system" ( Burke, 1978, p. 809; cf. Osgood, 1980) and that "[c]ommunication by means of symbols . . . is one of the singularities of humankind" ( Elias, 1991, p. 4; cf. Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1951; Rommetveit, 1968). This model implicitly or explicitly pervades a great deal of classical and contemporary communication theorizing and research.
Comment by Margith A. Strand, M.S., B.S.
One of the most prominent manifestations of this structural presupposition is the symbol model, the general characterization of language or communication as a semiotic process centrally involving "signs," "signals," and, especially, "symbols" or "symbolizing." The symbol model is manifested most clearly in the claims that language is "a conventional, arbitrary symbol system" ( Burke, 1978, p. 809; cf. Osgood, 1980) and that "[c]ommunication by means of symbols . . . is one of the singularities of humankind" ( Elias, 1991, p. 4; cf. Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1951; Rommetveit, 1968). This model implicitly or explicitly pervades a great deal of classical and contemporary communication theorizing and research.
Comment by Margith A. Strand, M.S., B.S.
There have been a significant amount of research that has been done in this area, in relation to Semiotics in the recent years. I have kept abreast of the research as sent to me through the internet research communication venues. Thank you.
M. Strand
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