From: Logical Learning Theory: A Human Teleology and Its Empirical Support. Contributors: Joseph F. Rychlak - author. Publisher: University of Nebraska Press. Place of Publication: Lincoln, NE. Publication Year: 1994. Page Number: 93.

In fact, we are unable to control or manipulate logical processes in the same way that we control processes in the (efficiently caused) biophysical realm. Predicated meanings (contents) can be supplanted, but the precedentsequacious force of deduction, inference, and so on (process) is not amenable to controlled direction in the way that we drive our automobiles about or take medications to correct a physical ailment. Kahneman and Tversky ( 1972 ; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982 ; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983 ) have shown that although people rarely make decisions in the way that logicians, mathematicians, or statisticians do, and although they can easily be led astray by irrelevancies when predicating, there is nevertheless a detectable rulelike order taking place in their erratic and unsound course of mentation (see also Nisbett & Ross, 1980 ).

The grounds may shift, and the person may forgo a rigid rule in preference of a more flexible semantic formulation; for example, subjects are seen to solve word analogies by means of heuristics rather than inflexible algorithmic rules ( Sadler & Shoben, 1993 ). There is nevertheless a controlling order in such cognition, representing a psychical (Logos) rather than a physical (Physikos / Bios) determinism. Psychical determinism can be of the "hard" variety, of course, meaning that it is just as intractable as a physical determination (see Rychlak, 1988, p. 245 ). The concept of will reflects this hard determinism, and, as I noted in chapter 2, a free will notion combines the capacity to select the grounds ("freely") for the sake of which an action is then necessarily carried out ("willfully").