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Dialectics and Hermeneutics..Jan 26, 2011

Hermeneutics and Dialectics: (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and) Hans-Georg Gadamer
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Khan, Haider

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Haider Khan
Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore briefly the role that a more phenomenological conception of dialectical development of consciousness plays in Hans-Georg Gadamer's work on hermeneutics. This is done with both an implicit understanding of the dialectical development of consciousness and self-consciousness in Gadamer and some explicit references to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and his Science of Logic in connection with Gadamer's work. However, the twentieth century departures from Hegelian logic by the phenomenological and existential philosophers are given crucial importance for the work of Gadamer which builds on both Heidegger's essays on art in particular and the much earlier Husserlian explorations of consciousness and intentionality. Special emphasis is given to Gadamer's concept of Spiel(play)* along with his ideas of Erfahrung( "lived experience" as opposed to Erlebnis or abstract experience),Geschehen (event) and Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein ( Effectively historicized consciousness).
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Keywords: Hermeneutics; Method; Truth; Dialectics; Dialogue; Play; History; Effectively Historicized Consciousness; Event; Lived Experience; Phenomenology.;

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B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology


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My intention and goals of my efforts...left to right...Margith:) Descriptive only....:)

Diagram by
Naail Mohammed Kamil
Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences,
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Principles of Dialectic/ Placed by Margith Strand for Dissertation/Fielding

Principles
Fichtean/Hegelian Dialectics is based on three (or four) basic concepts:
1. Everything is transient and finite, existing in the medium of time (this idea is not accepted by some dialecticians).
2. Everything is made out of opposing forces/opposing sides (contradictions).
3. Gradual changes lead to turning points, where one force overcomes the other (quantitative change leads to qualitative change).
4. Change moves in spirals (or helices), not circles (sometimes referred to as "negation of the negation").[citation needed]
Within this broad qualification, dialectics has a rich and varied history. It has been stated that the history of dialectic is identical to the extensive history of philosophy.[3] The basic idea is perhaps already present in Heraclitus of Ephesus, who held that all is in constant change, as a result of inner strife and opposition.[4][5][6]
The aim of the dialectical method is resolution of the disagreement through rational discussion,[7][8] and ultimately the search for truth. One way to proceed — the Socratic method — is to show that a given hypothesis (with other admissions) leads to a contradiction; thus, forcing the withdrawal of the hypothesis as a candidate for truth (see also reductio ad absurdum). Another way of trying to resolve a disagreement is by denying some presupposition of both the contending thesis and antithesis; thereby moving to a third (syn)thesis or "sublation". However, the rejection of the participants' presuppositions can be resisted, which might generate a second-order controversy.[9]
[edit] Western forms
[edit] Classical philosophy
The term "dialectic" owes much of its prestige to its role in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato. According to Aristotle,[10] it was Zeno of Elea who 'invented' dialectic. Plato's dialogues are the best ancient written examples that show the Socratic dialectic method in great detail.
In classical philosophy, dialectic (Greek: διαλεκτική) is a form of reasoning based on the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses). The outcome of such an exchange might be the refutation of one of the relevant points of view, or a synthesis or combination of the opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the dialogue.[11][12]
[edit] Socratic dialogue
Main article: Socratic dialogue
In Plato's dialogues and other Socratic dialogues, Socrates attempts to examine someone's beliefs, at times even first principles or premises by which we all reason and argue. Socrates typically argues by cross-examining his interlocutor's claims and premises in order to draw out a contradiction or inconsistency among them. According to Plato, the rational detection of error amounts to finding the proof of the antithesis.[13] However, important as this objective is, the principal aim of Socratic activity seems to be to improve the soul of his interlocutors, by freeing them from unrecognized errors.
For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least one thing exists which certain gods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one thing which is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by the gods) — which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety is not sufficiently meaningful.
[edit] Medieval philosophy
Dialectics (also called logic) was one of the three liberal arts taught in medieval universities as part of the trivium. The trivium also included rhetoric and grammar.[14][15][16][17]
Based mainly on Aristotle, the first medieval philosopher to work on dialectics was Boethius.[18] After him, many scholastic philosophers also made use of dialectics in their works, such as Abelard,[19] William of Sherwood,[20] Garlandus Compotista,[21] Walter Burley, Roger Swyneshed and William of Ockham.[22]
This dialectic was formed as follows:
1. The Question to be determined
2. The principal objections to the question
3. An argument in favor of the Question, traditionally a single argument ("On the contrary..")
4. The determination of the Question after weighing the evidence. ("I answer that...")
5. The replies to each objection
[edit] Modern philosophy
The concept of dialectics was given new life by Hegel (following Fichte), whose dialectically dynamic model of nature and of history made it, as it were, a fundamental aspect of the nature of reality (instead of regarding the contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of the dialectical method, as Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason).[23][24] In the mid-19th century, the concept of "dialectic" was appropriated by Marx (see, for example, Das Kapital, published in 1867) and Engels and retooled in a non-idealist manner, becoming a crucial notion in their philosophy of dialectical materialism. Thus this concept has played a prominent role on the world stage and in world history. In contemporary polemics, "dialectics" may also refer to an understanding of how we can or should perceive the world (epistemology); an assertion that the nature of the world outside one's perception is interconnected, contradictory, and dynamic (ontology); or it can refer to a method of presentation of ideas and conclusions (discourse). According to Hegel, "dialectic" is the method by which human history unfolds; that is to say, history progresses as a dialectical process.

Dialectic..

Dialectic (also called dialectics or the dialectical method) is a method of argument, which has been central to both Indic and Western philosophy since ancient times. The word "dialectic" originates in Ancient Greece, and was made popular by Plato in his Socratic dialogues. Dialectic is based on a dialogue between two or more people who may hold differing views, yet wish to seek the truth of the matter through the exchange of their viewpoints while applying reason. [1] This differs from a debate, in which both sides are committed to their viewpoint and only wish to win the debate by persuading or proving themselves right (or the other side wrong) --and thus a jury or judge is often needed to decide the matter. It also differs from rhetoric, which is oratory that appeals to logos, pathos, or ethos. Rhetoric is communication designed to persuade an audience to side with a particular argument or action.

From: Wikipedia

The Sophists taught "arête" (quality, excellence) as the highest value and determinant of one's actions in life. The Sophists taught artistic quality in oratory (as we might teach someone to both write and to deliver a moving or motivational monologue) as (one) manner of demonstrating one's "arête". They taught oratory as an art form, used to both please and to influence others through the excellence of one's speeches (as opposed to using logical arguments). (The Sophists taught that a person should seek arête in all that he did, not just oratory).

Socrates favored "Truth" as the highest value, holding that it could be discovered through reason and logic in discussion: ergo, dialectic. Socrates valued rationality, i.e. logical appeal, above emotional appeal, as the proper means for persuasion, discovery of truth, and as the determinant of action. To Socrates, Truth, not arête, was the higher good, and each person should seek Truth above all to guide his life. Socrates therefore opposed the Sophists and their teaching of rhetoric as artistic, emotional oratory that did not require logic or proof. [2] Different forms of dialectical reason have emerged in the Indosphere and in the West, as well as during different eras of history (see below). Among the major forms of dialectic reason are Socratic, Hindu, Buddhist, Medieval, Hegelian, Marxist, and Talmudic.

From: Wikipedia

Pattern Variables by T. Parsons/

Sociology 319
January 18, 2006

Talcott Parsons

3. Pattern Variables

Note: See diagram 1 of the January 16 handout.

One way that Parsons organized his analysis of social action and activities within social systems is through pattern variables. Remember that social action is voluntary, oriented, and subject to guidance or influence of social norms. These pattern variables provide a way of categorizing the types of choices and forms of orientation for individual social actors, both in contemporary society and historically. The variables include “categorization of modes of orientation in personality systems, the value patterns of culture, and the normative requirements in social systems” (Turner, p. 58) Adams and Sydie state that these are means of guiding “individuals toward one or other of a set of dichotomous choices” (p. 15).

Pattern variables also provide a means of describing and classifying institutions, social relationships, and different societies, and the values and norms of these. All of the norms, values, roles, institutions, subsystems and even the society as a whole can be classified and examined on the basis of these pattern variables. For Parsons, these were necessary to make the theory of action more explicit and “to develop clearer specifications of what different contingencies and expectations actors were likely to face” (Wallace and Wolf, p. 30).

The pattern variables are constructed as polar opposites that give the range of possible decisions and modes of orientation for a social actor. They are ideal types of social action that, for Parsons, provided a conceptual scheme for analyzing action within systems. In practice, individual choice is unlikely to be so starkly divided between the polar opposites and the social action of an individual may be a combination of the two, between the opposites. That is, there may be a continuity of possible forms of action bridging the extremes, so that much social action occurs between the poles.

Two further points to note about the January 16, 2006 handout.

• Each of the pattern variables has a primary focus, which I term “aspect.” For example the particularistic-universalistic poles are primarily concerned with the range of people involved in a system of social action while the diffuseness-specificity poles refer to the range of obligations of a social actor.

• The handout also includes a similar set of ideal types from the writings and analysis of the classical sociologists. For Marx, the great distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist society was the conversion of goods and services into commodities, so that useful goods and services (use values) became transformed into commodities that exchange for each other (exchange values). It is this set of exchanges that takes hold of society and the workings of markets where commodities and labour power are exchanged become the governing force in a capitalist society. For Durkheim, traditional societies were charactized by similarity among members, where repressive or penal law operated, and where the form of solidarity was mechanical. In modern society, where a division of labour develops so that individuals perform a variety of different tasks, individualism is emphasized with different individuals. Such a system is characterized by restitutive or restorative law, ensuring that following a crime there is some restoration of an original state of affairs. Durkheim considers this to be similar to the functioning of a healthy body and he termed the form of social solidarity governing such a society as organic solidarity. For Weber, tradition and charisma formed the basis for authority in traditional societies; in modern societies authority has a bureaucratic, rational, and legal basis. As with Durkheim, Simmel considered traditional society to be characterized by similarity and sameness, usually in the rural, village, or community setting. In contrast, sociation or social relationships in the modern setting were more likely to occur in an urban setting, where a self developed and individualism was emphasized. Simmel argued that in such a setting, individuals have many contacts, but often of a limited or fleeting sort, so that each individual develops a personality to manage these encounters and, at the same time, be able to make an impression. Fashion and style become means of doing this.

The pattern variables are as follows:

a. Affectivity and Affective Neutrality. This set of concepts refers to the amount of emotion or affect that is appropriate or expected in an given form of interaction. Particular individuals and diffuse obligations (see c and d) are associated with affectivity, whereas contacts with many individuals (universalistic) in a bureaucracy may be devoid of emotion and characterized by affective neutrality. Affective neutrality may refer to self discipline and the deferment of gratification (eg. Weber’s spirit of capitalism). In contrast, affectivity may be associated with expressing emotions. Adams and Sydie also refer to affective neutrality being associated with ego control (p. 15).

b. Collectivity or Self. This pair emphasizes the extent of collective or shared interest as opposed to self interest that is associated with social action. Each social action is carried out in a social context and in various types of collectivities. Where individuals pursue a collective form of action, then the interests of the collectivity may take precedence over that of the individual, for example, in Durkheim’s traditional society, mechanical solidarity, or even in contemporary family activities. Various forms of action such as altruism, charity, self-sacrifice (in wartime) also fit this variable. In modern societies, individual success and instrumental activity often become dominant in social action, especially in economic action. Models of the latter assume there is egoism or self-interest in individual economic action, and this forms the basis on which much social and economic analysis is constructed.

c. Particularism and Universalism. This pair refers to the range of people that an individual must consider when involved in social action. The issue here is whether to react “on the basis of a general norm or on the basis of someone’s particular relationship to you” (Wallace and Wolf, p. 34). A particular relation is a relationship of a social actor with a specific individual. Parent-child or friendship relationships tend to be of this sort, where the relationship is very particular. In contrast, a bureaucracy is characterized by universal forms of relationships, where everyone is to be treated impartially and according to the same procedures or rules. In such parts of modern society, the ideal is that there is to be no particularism or favoritism is to be extended to anyone, even to a close friend or family member.

NOTE: The following are reversed in the table in Adams and Sydie, p. 15. The correct order is the following.

d. Diffuseness and Specificity. In contrast to the range of people involved in variable c, diffuseness and specificity deal with the range of obligations involved. These refer to the nature of social contacts and how extensive or how narrow are the obligations in any interaction. For example, in a bureaucracy, social relationships are very specific, where we meet with or contact someone for some very particular reason associated with their status and position, e.g. visiting a physician. In contrast, traditional society, friendships, and parent-child relationships are examples of more diffuse forms of contact – involving few people but having a broad or diffuse range of obligations. We rely on friends for a broad range of types of support, including conversation, support, accommodation, and intimate relationships. While there may be limits on such contacts, the diffuse relationships associated with traditional society or friendship have the potential of dealing with almost any set of interests and problems.

e. Ascription and Achievement. Ascription refers to qualities of individuals, often inborn qualities such as sex, ethnicity, race, age, family status, or characteristics of the household of origin. In traditional society, these often governed an individual’s life course or life chances. Achievement refers to performance of an individual and emphasizes what that individual achieves in life. For example, we might say that someone has achieved a prestigious position even though their ascribed status was that of poverty and disadvantage. While modern society does not always provide for opportunity to achieve or reward merit, the ideal goal is generally one that each individual should be provided an opportunity to achieve what they are capable of achieving. Where this is not permitted, this may mean there is discrimination, inequity, or violation of rights. For Fraser and Honneth this could be a result of misrecognition.

f. Expressive and Instrumental. Parsons regards the first half of each pair as the expressive types of characteristics and the second half of the pattern as the instrumental types of characteristics. Expressive aspects refer to “the integrative and tension aspects” (Morgan, p. 29). These are people, roles, and actions concerned with taking care of the common task culture, how to integrate the group, and how to manage and resolve internal tensions and conflicts. This may take many different forms but often is associated with the family, and more specifically with the female role in the family.

The instrumental characteristics refer to “the goal attainment and adaptation aspects” (Morgan, p. 29). These are the characteristics, people, roles, and actions associated with ideas, problem solving, getting the task done. These tasks are often associated with male roles, public activities, the economy, or politics.

The pattern variables can be used to refer to either the type of social action or the type of society. Social action and interaction in early forms of society were more likely to be characterized by expressive characteristics. In contrast, in modern societies, with a more complex division of labour and differentiation of statuses and roles, much of social action and interaction is characterized by instrumental characteristics.

4. Functional System Problems – AGIL (P) (Adams and Sydie, p. 17 and diagram 3 of the January 16 handout).

According to Parsons, social systems have needs. In order to survive and continue, each social system or subsystem has four characteristics that must be met. These are functional needs of the system, “a complex of activities directed towards meeting a need or needs of the system.” (Ritzer, p. 240). The first two are necessary for survival and continued operation (instrumental or production and reproduction), with the last two being a means of regulation of the social system (consummatory or completion). The functions can also be classified by whether they refer entirely to social action within the system (internal) or whether they refer to how social action in any system deals with external conditions (external). In the handout, the sector of society that is most closely indentified with each function is also given. While the sectors overlap with more than one AGIL function for each sector, this is an ideal type way of sorting through some of the functions and sectors of a social system. These functional needs can be remembered by the acronym AGIL, and these functions are a set of ideal types.

a. Adaptation (A). Each system exists in an environment, and must be able to adapt to this environment. In the process of adaptation, the environment is also affected and may become oriented or adapted to the society. This is the mobilization of resources so that the system can survive and that things can be done to meet goals of the system. In the family or household, adaptation could include obtaining economic resources – earning an income to support the family. For larger social systems, the economy that produces the goods and services for members of a society allows the society as a system to survive, grow, change, and develop. The major institutions in the economic sphere, agriculture, industry, and services provided through the market are the means by which adaptation takes place. These serve the function of allowing the system to survive and provide the goods and services required for society to operate. In economic analysis, there are equilibrating mechanisms within the economy that tend toward producing an orderly outcome. The market mechanism itself can be regarded as a system that has tendencies in the direction of stable equilibria. Some of the government institutions relating to the economy also help serve this function (infrastructure, defense). Note also how the economy as a system modifies the natural environment.

b. Goal Attainment (G). Each system has certain purposes associated with it. The goals of the system must be defined, means of attempting to achieve these goals must be laid out, and then these goals must be achieved. Within the social system, the polity (political sphere and government) is an important aspect of this, setting and altering the goals for the society as a whole, and “mobilizing actors and resources to that end” (Ritzer, p. 246). The state bureaucracy and other organizations – business and nonprofit – all help to implement and achieve these goals. Smaller scale institutions also have goals, for example, the University of Regina as a system has the goal of teaching, research, and community service. Within a family or individual system, there will also be goals, although these may not be so clearly spelled out as in formal organizations. Each organization, as a subsystem, has certain goals, and within this there will be positions with roles to play in helping the organization achieve these goals. Within a business, there will be marketing, production, finance, etc. positions that each have specific roles within the context of attempting to make profits for the business and help the business expand. Within the family, husband and wife, parents and children are each statuses with roles for meeting family goals.

c. Integration (I). This is the means by which social relationships, and interrelationships among units or groups, are regulated. One aspect of these is the rules and procedures associated with an institution, organization, or system. “By integration Parsons means the need to coordinate, adjust, and regulate relationships among various actors or units within the system … in order to keep the system functioning” (Wallace and Wolf, pp. 39-40).

As various social process functions occur, strains, tensions and conflicts may emerge. These are a result of the way that individuals relate to each other, and as different units carry out their tasks and roles that need to be done in a system. At the level of society as a whole, there are a variety of institutions and ways that these functions are performed. Socialization is a major function with respect to the raising of children, and also with respect to the ongoing socialization that occurs through over the life span. Religion, education, the media, the legal structures – police and courts – all play a role. Ritzer refers to these as societal community. Any institutions that help disseminate the shared culture, and reinforce “that culture through ritual celebrations of its values” (Cuff, p. 45) help in this. Sporting events could be seen in this light – anthems, rules of the game, common allegiances, etc. Where strains are great, there may be a need for social control, formal and informal sanctions, or discipline so that the system can enforce social order. In general though, Parsons argued that systems develop automatic means of integration, along with roles and organizations to assist integration. Within subsystems, there is a set of roles that do this, although these may not always be specialized. For example, in educational institutions, teachers carry out the roles of adaptation, goal attainment, and integration as part of their activities. Norms are also important in providing guidance, along with social approval and disapproval, which tend towards enforcement of the norms.

d. Latency (L) or pattern maintenance (P). This is the function of pattern maintenance and Parsons also refers to this as the cultural-motivational system (Parsons, 1967, p. 261). These are referred to as latent because they may not always be as apparent as the A, G, or I functions. These involve means of managing these tensions and diffusing and resolving conflicts, so that there are orderly means of carrying on activities. For Parsons, “All institutionalization involves common moral as well as other values. Collectivity obligations are, therefore, an aspect of every institutionalized role. But in certain contexts of orientation-choice, these obligations may be latent ... .” (Parsons, 1951, p. 99). Even though these exist they may not be readily apparent and thus are latent. The test of their nature would be to determine the actors reaction in a specific situation.

The organizations and roles that perform latent functions can be regarded as those that “furnish, maintain, and renew both the motivation of individuals and the cultural patterns that create and sustain this motivation” (Ritzer, p. 242). Parsons refers to these as fiduciary, that is, founded on trust. At the level of the social system, these are schools, educational institutions, and the major institution that is concerned with the latent function is kinship and family or other forms of personal relationships. Within this, leisure, affection, love, sex, and friendship, can all play an important function. People provide comfort, consolation and relief to each other, thus reducing tension or keeping it within manageable limits. For Parsons, the role of women was key here, as will be seen when discussing his view about proper family structures and functioning. Within organizations, there may be few latent functions that are an explicit part of the organization, but people within any organization tend to develop these, or come to the organization with these functions developed.

For Parsons, the AGIL functions exist at all levels of society and in each subsystem. These may not be consciously worked out functions, and roles and functions can be shared among organizations or individuals. In traditional societies, most of these functions would have been centred in family and kinship structures, and in local communities. In the traditional society, there may have been little differentiation in functions, although culture and the integration function often came to be associated with religion. As societies have developed, these functions tend to evolve and differentiate themselves, with different institutions emerging to undertake different functions; within organizations, as they develop, there is a differentiation of functions, so that organizations become more bureaucratic, with different departments, branches, and programs developing responsibilities for separate functions – finance, human resources, marketing, service, production. Specialized functions and roles develop, and specialized institutions to carry these out also evolve, and it is best to have specialized roles and specialized institutions to carry out the functions of a modern, complex society. These may develop in an evolutionary fashion, without any conscious consideration, much like Durkheim's “natural” development of the division of labour. Or, as in bureaucracies, they may be consciously worked out organizational structures.

References
Adams, Bert N. and R. A. Sydie, Sociological Theory, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge, 2001
Adams, Bert N. and R. A. Sydie, Contemporary Sociological Theory, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge, 2002
Cohen, Ira. J., “Theories of Action and Praxis,” in Bryan S. Turner, editor, The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, second edition, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
Coser, Rose Laub, The Family: Its Structure and Functions, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964. HQ728 C6
Cuff, E. C., W. W. Sharrock and D. W. Francis, Perspectives in Sociology, third edition London, Routledge, 1992. HM66 P36 1984
Davis, Kingsley and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power, second edition, New York, Free Press, 1966, pp. 47-53. HT 605 B4 1966
Grabb, Edward G., Theories of Social Inequality: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives, second edition, Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1990. HT609 G72
Johnson, Miriam M., "Functionalism and Feminism: Is Estrangement Necessary?" in Paul England, editor, Theory on Gender / Feminism on Theory, New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 1993, pp. 115-130. HQ 1190 T48 1993
Knapp, Peter, One World – Many Worlds: Contemporary Sociological Theory, New York, Harper-Collins, 1994.
Morgan, D. H. J. Social Theory and the Family, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. HQ728 M574
Parsons, Talcott, The Social System, New York, Free Press, 1951. HM51 P35
Parsons, Talcott, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, New York, Free Press, 1967. HM51P37
Parsons, Talcott and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and Interaction Process, Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1955. HQ734 P3
Ritzer, George, Sociological Theory, third edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1992. HM24 R4938.
Turner, Jonathan H., The Structure of Sociological Theory, fifth edition, Belmont, Ca., Wadsworth, 1991. HM24 T84
Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf, Contemporary Sociological Theory: Continuing the Classical Tradition, fourth edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1995

Last edited January 20, 2006

Concreteness...Imagery..Placed by Margith Strand

Effects of concreteness and semantic relatedness on composite imagery ratings and cued recall.
Paivio A, Clark JM, Khan M.

PMID: 3173090 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]


Publication Types, MeSH TermsPublication Types:
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
MeSH Terms:
Cues
Humans
Imagination*
Memory*
Mental Recall*
Paired-Associate Learning*
Semantics*
LinkOut - more resources

A. TheWay into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy
by Inquring Back From the Pre-given Life-
World
28 Kant’s unexpressed “presupposition”: the surrounding
world of life, taken for granted as valid.
KANT IS CERTAIN that his philosophy will bring the dominant rationalism to its downfall
by exhibiting the inadequacy of its foundations. He rightly reproaches rationalism for
neglecting questions which should have been its fundamental questions; that is, it had never
penetrated to the subjective structure of our world-consciousness prior to and within scientific
knowledge and thus had never asked how the world, which appears straightforwardly
to us men, and to us as scientists, comes to be knowable a priori-how, that is, the exact
science of nature is possible, the science for which, after all, pure mathematics, together
with a further pure a priori, is the instrument of all knowledge which is objective, [i.e.,]
unconditionally valid for everyone who is rational (who thinks logically).
20
But Kant, for his part, has no idea that in his philosophizing he stands on unquestioned
presuppositions and that the undoubtedly great discoveries in his theories are there only in
concealment; that is, they are not there as finished results, just as the theories themselves are
not finished theories, i.e., do not have a definitive scientific form. What he offers demands
new work and, above all, critical analysis. An example of a great discovery — a merely
preliminary discovery-is the “understanding”
which has, in respect to nature, two functions1 : understanding interpreting itself, in
explicit self-reflection, as normative laws, and, on the other hand, understanding ruling in
concealment, i.e., ruling as constitutive of the always already developed and always further
developing meaning-configuration “intuitively given surrounding world.” This discovery
could never be actually grounded or even be fully comprehensible in the manner of the
Kantian theory, i.e., as a result of his merely regressive method. In the “transcendental
deduction” of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes an approach to a
direct grounding, one which descends to the original sources, only to break off again almost
at once without arriving at the genuine problems of foundation which are to be opened up
from this supposedly psychological side.
We shall begin our considerations by showing that Kant’s inquiries in the critique of
reason have an unquestioned ground of presuppositions which codetermine the meaning of
his questions. Sciences to whose truths and methods Kant attributes actual validity become
a problem, and with them the spheres of being [Seinssphren] themselves to which these
sciences refer. They become a problem in virtue of certain questions which take knowing
subjectivity, too, into account, questions which find their answer in theories about transcendentally
forming subjectivity, about the transcendental achievements of sensibility, of the
understanding, etc., and, on the highest level, theories about functions of the “I” of “transcendental
apperception.” What had become an enigma, the achievement of mathematical
natural science and of pure mathematics (in our broadened sense) as its logical method, was
supposed to have been made comprehensible through these theories; but the theories also
led to a revolutionary reinterpretation of the actual ontic meaning of nature as the world of
possible experience and possible knowledge and thus correlatively to the reinterpretation of
the actual truth — meaning of the sciences concerned.
Naturally, from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday
surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing-the surrounding world in which all of
us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are also the
sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In this world we
are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world, namely, as being
1. Reading “. . . ist der hinsichtlich der Natur doppelt fungierende Verstand. . . .”
here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything that is established
scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology. On the other hand, we are
subjects for this world, namely, as the ego-subjects experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing
21
it, related to it purposefully; for us this surrounding world has only the ontic meaning given
to it by our experiencings, our thoughts, our valuations, etc.; and it has the modes of validity
(certainty of being, possibility, perhaps illusion, etc.) which we, as the subjects of validity,
at the same time bring about or else possess from earlier on as habitual acquisitions and
bear within us as validities of such and such a content which we can reactualize at will. To
be sure, all this undergoes manifold alterations, whereas “the” world, as existing in a unified
way, persists throughout, being corrected only in its content.
Clearly the content-alteration of the perceived object, being change or motion perceived
as belonging to the object itself, is distinguished with self-evidence from the alteration of its
manners of appearing (e.g., the perspectives, the near and far appearances) through which
something objective of this type exhibits itself as being itself present. We see this in the
change of [our] attitude. [If we are] directed straightforwardly toward the object and what
belongs to it, [our] gaze passes through the appearances toward what continuously appears
through their continuous unification: the object, with the ontic validity of the mode “itself
present.” In the reflective attitude, [by contrast,] we have not a one but a manifold. Now
the sequence of the appearances themselves is thematic, rather than what appears in them.
Perception is the primal mode of intuition [Anschauung]; it exhibits with primal originality,
that is, in the mode of self-presence. In addition, there are other modes of intuition which in
themselves consciously have the character of [giving us] modifications of this “itself there” as
themselves present. These are presentifications, modifications of presentations2; they make
us conscious of the modalities of time, e.g., not that which is-itselfthere but that which
was-itself-there or that which is in the future, that which will-be-itself-there. Presentifying
intuitions “recapitulate” — in certain modifications belonging to them — all the manifolds
of appearance through which what is objective exhibits itself perceptively. Recollecting
intuition, for example,
2. Vergegenwrtigungen, i.e., modifications of Gegenwrtigungen. The former are explicit acts of
rendering consciously present that which is not “itself present,” as in the case of recollection or
imagination.
shows the object as having-been-itself-there, recapitulating the perspectivization and other
manners of appearing, though in recollective modifications. I am now conscious of this
perspectivization as one which has been, a sequence of subjective “exhibitions of,” havingbeen
in my earlier ontic validities.
Here we can now clarify the very limited justification for speaking of a sense-world, a
world of sense-intuition, a sensible world of appearances. In all the verifications of the
life of our natural interests, which remain purely in the life-world, the return to “sensibly”
experiencing intuition plays a prominent role. For everything that exhibits itself in the lifeworld
as a concrete thing obviously has a bodily character, even if it is not a mere body,
as, for example, an animal or a cultural object, i.e., even if it also has psychic or otherwise
spiritual properties. If we pay attention now purely to the bodily aspect of the things, this
obviously exhibits itself perceptively only in seeing, in touching, in hearing, etc., i.e., in
22
visual, tactual, acoustical, and other such aspects. Obviously and inevitably participating
in this is our living body, which is never absent from the perceptual field, and specifically its
corresponding “organs of perception” (eyes, hands, ears, etc.). In consciousness they play a
constant role here; specifically they function in seeing, hearing, etc., together with the ego’s
motility belonging to them, i.e., what is called kinesthesis. All kinestheses, each being an “I
move,” “I do,” [etc.] are bound together in a comprehensive unity — in which kinesthetic
holding-still is [also] a mode of the “I do.” Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever body
is appearing in perception, and the kinestheses, are not processes [simply running] alongside
each other; rather, they work together in such a way that the aspects have the ontic meaning
of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects
continually required by the kinestheses — by the kinesthetic-sensual total situation in each
of its working variations of the total kinesthesis by setting in motion this or that particular
kinesthesis — and that they correspondingly fulfill the requirement.
Thus sensibility, the ego’s active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs,
belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of bodies. It proceeds in consciousness
not as a mere series of body-appearances, as if these in themselves, through themselves
alone and their coalescences, were appearance of bodies; rather, they are such in consciousness
only in combination with the kinesthetically functioning living body [Leiblichkeit], the
ego functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality. In a quite unique way
the living body is constantly in the perceptual field quite immediately, with a completely
unique ontic meaning, precisely the meaning indicated by the word “organ” (here used in its
most primitive sense), [namely, as] that through which I exist in a completely unique way
and quite immediately as the ego of affection and actions, [as that] in which I hold sway 3
quite immediately, kinesthetically — articulated into particular organs through which I hold
sway, or potentially hold sway, in particular kinestheses corresponding to them. And this
“holding-sway,” here exhibited as functioning in all perception of bodies — the familiar, total
system of kinestheses available to consciousness — is actualized in the particular kinesthetic
situation [and] is perpetually bound to a [general] situation in which bodies appear, i.e., that
of the field of perception. To the variety of appearances through which a body is perceivable
as this one-and-the-same body correspond, in their own way, the kinestheses which belong
to this body; as these kinestheses are allowed to run their course, the corresponding required
appearances must show up in order to be appearances of this body at all, i.e., in order to be
appearances which exhibit in themselves this body with its properties.
Thus, purely in terms of perception, physical body and living body [Krper and Leib] 4
are essentially different; living body, that is, [understood] as the only one which is actually
given [to me as such] in perception: my own living body. How the consciousness originates
through which my living body nevertheless acquires the ontic validity of one physical body
among others, and how, on the other hand, certain physical bodies in my perceptual field
come to count as living bodies, living bodies of “alien” ego-subjects-these are now necessary
questions.
23
In our reflections we confined ourselves to the perceiving consciousness of things, to one’s
own perceiving of them, to my perceptual field. Here my own living body alone, and never
an alien living body, can be perceived as living; the latter is perceived
3. walten. “Holding sway” is somewhat awkward in English, but it seems to best approximate
Husserl’s use of this archaic term. The latter is often used in religious language (Gottes Walten) to
signify God’s rule and power over the world and his intervention in its affairs. The English “wield”
is related to it but is transitive. Husserl uses the term primarily in connection with the living body
(unlike Heidegger, who resurrected it for a different purpose), meaning one’s “wielding” of the body
and its organs so as to have some control of one’s surroundings.
4. See §g, note 15.
only as a physical body. In my perceptual field I find myself holding sway as ego through
my organs and generally through everything belonging to me as an ego in my ego-acts and
faculties. However, though the objects of the life-world, if they are to show their very own
being, necessarily show themselves as physical bodies, this does not mean that they show
themselves only in this way; and [similarly] we, though we are related through the living body
to all objects which exist for us, are not related to them solely as a living body. Thus if it is
a question of objects in the perceptual field, we are perceptually also in the field5 ; and the
same is true, in modification, of every intuitive field, and even of every nonintuitive one, since
we are obviously capable of “representing” to ourselves everything which is nonintuitively
before us (though we are sometimes temporally limited in this). [Being related] “through the
living body” clearly does not mean merely [being related] “as a physical body”; rather, the
expression refers to the kinesthetic, to functioning as an ego in this peculiar way, primarily
through seeing, hearing, etc.; and of course other modes of the ego belong to this (for
example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and the like).
But being an ego through the living body [die leibliche Ichlichkeit] is of course not the
only way of being an ego, and none of its ways can be severed from the others; throughout
all their transformations they form a unity. Thus we are concretely in the field of perception,
etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our
living body, but not only in this way, as full ego-subjects, each of us as the full-fledged
“I-the-man.” Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon,
as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-man” and all of us together, belong
to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid
for our consciousness as existing precisely through this “living together.” We, as living in
wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the
world; it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to
this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal
actively in different ways; through our acts they are “thematic” objects. As an example I
give the observant explication of the properties of something which appears perceptively, or
our activity of combining, relating, actively identifying and distinguishing,
5. I.e., as a physical body (Krper).
24
or our active evaluation, our projection of plans, our active realization of the planned means
and ends.
As subjects of acts (ego-subjects) we are directed toward thematic objects in modes of
primary and secondary, and perhaps also peripheral, directedness. In this preoccupation
with the objects the acts themselves are not thematic. But we are capable of coming back
and reflecting on ourselves and our current activity: it now becomes thematic and objective
through a new act, the vitally functioning one, which itself is now unthematic.
The consciousness of the world, then, is in constant motion; we are conscious of the world
always in terms of some objectcontent or other, in the alteration of the different ways of being
conscious (intuitive, nonintuitive, determined, undetermined, etc.) and also in the alteration
of affection and action, in such a way that there is always a total sphere of affection and such
that the affecting objects are now thematic, now unthematic; here we also find ourselves, we
who always and inevitably belong to the affective sphere, always functioning as subjects of
acts but only occasionally being thematically objective as the object of preoccupation with
ourselves.
Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together,
have the world pregiven in this “together,” as the world valid as existing for us and to which
we, together, belong, the world as world for all, pregiven with this ontic meaning. Constantly
functioning in wakeful life, we also function together, in the manifold ways of considering,
together, objects pregiven to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting
together. Here we find also that particular thematic alteration in which the we-subjectivity,
somehow constantly functioning, becomes a thematic object, whereby the acts through which
it functions also become thematic, though always with a residuum which remains unthematicremains,
so to speak, anonymous-namely, the reflections which are functioning in connection
with this theme.*
* Naturally all activity, and thus also this reflecting activity, gives rise to its habitual acquisitions.
In observing, we attain habitual knowledge, acquaintance with the object which exists for us in
terms of its previously unknown characteristics-and the same is true of self-knowledge through selfobservation.
In the evaluation of ourselves and the plans and actions related to ourselves and our
fellows, we likewise attain self-values and ends concerning ourselves [which become] our habitually
persisting validities. But all knowledge in general, all value-validities and ends in general, are, as
having been acquired through our activity, at the same time persisting properties of ourselves as
ego-subjects, as persons, and can be found in the reflective attitude as making up our own being.
Considering ourselves in particular as the scientists that we here factually find ourselves to
be, what corresponds to our particular manner of being as scientists is our present functioning
in the manner of scientific thinking, putting questions and answering them theoretically in
relation to nature or the world of the spirit; and [the latter are] at first nothing other than
the one or the other aspect of the life-world which, in advance, is already valid, which we
experience or are otherwise conscious of either prescientifically or scientifically. Cofunctioning
25
here are the other scientists who, united with us in a community of theory, acquire and have
the same truths or, in the communalization of accomplishing acts, are united with us in a
critical transaction aimed at critical agreement. On the other hand, we can be for others,
and they for us, mere objects; rather than being together in the unity of immediate, driving,
common theoretical interest, we can get to know one another observingly, taking note of
others’ acts of thought, acts of experiencing, and possibly other acts as objective facts, but
“disinterestedly,” without joining in performing these acts, without critically assenting to
them or taking exception to them.
Naturally, all these things are the most obvious of the obvious. Must one speak about
them, and with so much ado? In life certainly not. But not as a philosopher either? Is this
not the opening-up of a realm, indeed an infinite realm, of always ready and available but
never questioned ontic validities? Are they not constant presuppositions of scientific and,
at the highest level, philosophical thinking? Not, however, that it would or could ever be a
matter of utilizing these ontic validities in their objective truth.
It belongs to what is taken for granted, prior to all scientific thought and all philosophical
questioning, that the world is-always is in advance-and that every correction of an opinion,
whether an experiential or other opinion, presupposes the already existing world, namely,
as a horizon of what in the given case is indubitably valid as existing, and presupposes
within this horizon something familiar and doubtlessly certain with which that which is
perhaps canceled out as invalid came into conflict. Objective science, too, asks questions
only on the ground of this world’s existing in advance through prescientific life. Like all
praxis, objective science presupposes the being of this world, but it sets itself the task of
transposing knowledge which is imperfect and prescientific in respect of scope and constancy
into perfect knowledge-in accord with an idea of a correlative which is, to be sure, infinitely
distant, i.e., of a world which in itself is fixed and determined and of truths which are idealiter
scientific (”truths-in-themselves”) and which predicatively interpret this world. To realize
this in a systematic process, in stages of perfection, through a method which makes possible
a constant advance: this is the task.
For the human being in his surrounding world there are many types of praxis, and among
them is this peculiar and historically late one, theoretical praxis. It has its own professional
methods; it is the art of theories, of discovering and securing truths with a certain new ideal
sense which is foreign to prescientific life, the sense of a certain “final validity,” “universal
validity.”
Here we have again offered an example of exhibiting what is “obvious,” but this time
in order to make clear that in respect to all these manifold validities-in-advance, i.e., “presuppositions”
of the philosopher, there arise questions of being in a new and immediately
highly enigmatic dimension. These questions, too, concern the obviously existing, ever intuitively
pregiven world; but they are not questions belonging to that professional praxis and
technique (techne) which is called objective science, not questions belonging to that art of
grounding and broadening the realm of objectively scientific truths about this surrounding
26
world; rather, they are questions of how the object, the prescientifically and then the scientifically
true object, stands in relation to all the subjective elements which everywhere have
a voice in what is taken for granted in advance.
29 The life-world can be disclosed as a realm of subjective

The life-world can be disclosed as a realm of subjective
phenomena which have remained “anonymous.”
WHEN WE PROCEED, philosophizing with Kant, not by starting from his beginning and
moving forward in his paths but by inquiring back into what was thus taken for granted
(that of which Kantian thinking, like everyone’s thinking, makes use as unquestioned and
available), when we become conscious of it as “presuppositions” and accord these their own
universal and theoretical interest, there opens up to us, to our growing astonishment, an
infinity of ever new phenomena belonging to a new dimension, coming to light only through
consistent penetration into the meaning and validity-implications of what was thus taken
for granted — an infinity, because continued penetration shows that every phenomenon
attained through this unfolding of meaning, given at first in the life-world as obviously
existing, itself contains meaning- and validity-implications whose exposition leads again to
new phenomena, and so on. These are purely subjective phenomena throughout, but not
merely facts involving psychological processes of sense-data; rather, they are mental [geistige]
processes which, as such, exercise with essential necessity the function of constituting forms
of meaning [Sinnesgestalten]. But they constitute them in each case out of mental “material”
which [itself] proves in turn, with essential necessity, to be mental form, i.e., to be constituted;
just as any newly developed form [of meaning] is destined to become material, namely, to
function in the constitution of [some new] form.
No objective science, no psychology — which, after all, sought to become the universal
science of the subjective — and no philosophy has ever made thematic and thereby actually
discovered this realm of the subjective-not even the Kantian philosophy, which sought, after
all, to go back to the subjective conditions of the possibility of an objectively experienceable
and knowable world. It is a realm of something subjective which is completely closed off
within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in all experiencing, all thinking, all life,
thus everywhere inseparably involved; yet it has never been held in view, never been grasped
and understood.
Does philosophy fulfill the sense of its primal establishment as the universal and ultimately
grounding science if it leaves this realm to its “anonymity”? Can it do this, can
any science do this which seeks to be a branch of philosophy, i.e., which would tolerate no
presuppositions, no basic sphere of beings beneath itself of which no one knows, which no
one interrogates scientifically, which no one has mastered in a knowing way? I called the
27
sciences in general branches of philosophy, whereas it is such a common conviction that the
objective, the positive, sciences stand on their own, are self-sufficient in virtue of their supposedly
fully grounding and thus exemplary method. But in the end is not the teleological
unifying meaning running through all attempted systems in the whole history of philosophy
that of achieving a breakthrough for the insight that science is only possible at all as universal
philosophy, the latter being, in all the sciences, yet a single science, possible only as
the totality of all knowledge? And did this not imply that they all repose upon one single
ground [Grund], one to be investigated scientifically in advance of all the others? And can
this ground be, I may add, any other than precisely that of the anonymous subjectivity we
mentioned? But one could and can realize this only when one finally and quite seriously inquires
into that which is taken for granted, which is presupposed by all thinking, all activity
of life with all its ends and accomplishments, and when one, by consistently interrogating
the ontic and validity-meaning of these ends and accomplishments, becomes aware of the
inviolable unity of the complex of meaning and validity running through all mental accomplishments.
This applies first of all to all the mental accomplishments which we human
beings carry out in the world, as individual, personal, or cultural accomplishments. Before
all such accomplishments there has always already been a universal accomplishment, presupposed
by all human praxis and all prescientific and scientific life. The latter have the
spiritual acquisitions of this universal accomplishment as their constant substratum, and all
their own acquisitions are destined to flow into it. We shall come to understand that the
world which constantly exists for us through the flowing alteration of manners of givenness is
a universal mental acquisition, having developed as such and at the same time continuing to
develop as the unity of a mental configuration, as a meaning-construct [Sinngebilde]- as the
construct of a universal, ultimately functioning 1 subjectivity. It belongs essentially to this
worldconstituting accomplishment that subjectivity objectifies itself as human subjectivity,
as an element of the world. All objective consideration of the world is consideration of the
“exterior” and grasps only “externals,” objective entities [Objektivitten]. The radical consideration
of the world is the systematic and purely internal consideration of the subjectivity
which “expresses” [or “externalizes”]2 itself in the exterior. It is like the unity of a living
organism, which one can certainly consider and dissect from the outside but which one can
understand only if one goes back to its hidden roots and systematically pursues the life
1. letztfungierende, i.e., functioning at the ultimate or deepest level.
2. der sich selbst im Aussen “ussernden” Subjektivitt.
which, in all its accomplishments, is in them and strives upward from them, shaping from
within. But is this not simply a metaphor? Is it not in the end our human being, and the
life of consciousness belonging to it, with its most profound world — problematics, which is
the place where all problems of living inner being and external exhibition are to be decided?

Edmund Husserl/ Transcendental- Phenomenology

The actual problem of Descartes, that of transcending egological (interpreted as internalpsychological)validities, including all manners of inference pertaining to the external world,the question of how these, which are, after all, themselves cogitationes in the encapsuled soul, are able to justify assertions about extra-psychic being — these problems disappear in Locke or turn into the problem of the psychological genesis of the real experiences of validity
or of the faculties belonging to them. That sense-data, extracted from the arbitrariness of their production, are affections from the outside and announce bodies in the external world,is not a problem for him but something taken for granted.

Especially portentous for future psychology and theory of knowledge is the fact that Locke makes no use of the Cartesian first introduction of the cogitatio as cogitatio of cogitata —that is, intentionality; he does not recognize it as a subject of investigation (indeed the
7most authentic subject of the foundation-laying investigations) . He is blind to the wholedistinction. The soul is something self-contained and real by itself, as is a body; in naive naturalism the soul is now taken to be like an isolated space, like a writing tablet, in his famous simile, on which psychic data come and go. This data-sensationalism, together with
the doctrine of outer and inner sense, dominates psychology and the theory of knowledge for centuries, even up to the present day; and in spite of the familiar struggle against “psychic atomism,” the basic sense of this doctrine does not change. Of course one speaks quite unavoidably, even in the Lockean terminology, of perceptions, representations “of” things,
or of believing “in something,” willing “something,” and the like. But no consideration is given to the fact that in the perceptions, in the experiences of consciousness themselves, that
of which we are conscious is included as such that the perception is in itself a perception of something, of “this tree.”
How is the life of the soul, which is through and through a life of consciousness, the intentional life of the ego, which has objects of which it is conscious, deals with them through
knowing, valuing, etc. — how is it supposed to be seriously investigated if intentionality is
overlooked? How can the problems of reason be attacked at all? Can they be attacked at all
as psychological problems? In the end, behind the psychological-epistemological problems,
do we not find the problems of the “ego” of the Cartesian epoche, touched upon but not grasped by Descartes? Perhaps these are not unimportant questions, which give a direction
in advance to the reader who thinks for himself. In any case they are an indication of what will become a serious problem in later parts of this work, or rather will serve as a way to
a philosophy which can really be carried through “without prejudice,” a philosophy with the most radical grounding in its setting of problems, in its method, and in work which is systematically accomplished.

Margith Strand/ January 21, 2011

http://psychology.wikia.com/wiki/Intentionality

Intentionality...

"The study of intentionality is common to the behavior of both animals and human beings. However, Frankfurt (1982) proposed that human intentionality is different from animal intentionality in that human beings can desire to contravene their conditioning. Bandura (1997, 2001b) suggested this is possible because of the singularly human ability of self-reflective evaluation and that studying human learning without considering human agency is unproductive. In the last several decades the terms executive function (Baumeister et al., 1998) and self-regulation (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994) have often been used as synonyms for conation, adding an additional dimension to the study of self (e.g., self-concept, self-esteem, self-reflection, self-determination, self-control)."

Huitt, W., & Cain, S. (2005). An overview of the conative domain. Educational Psychology Interactive. Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University. Retrieved Feb. 28 2008 from http://teach.valdosta.edu/whuitt/brilstar/chapters/conative.doc

Basically, it really is about love.....

Water is to Ethos as Volition is to......

Here it is! Placed by Margith Strand/ January 18, 2011

Even though studies of conation were trailing off heading into the mid-20th century, they were not completely forgotten. Erich Fromm in his work on "Human Ethics" discussed the conative nature of man by saying the way man achieves virtue is through the active use he makes of his powers.
"Uncertainty (the cognitive) is the very condition to impel a man to unfold his power. If he faces the truth without panic, he will recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by unfolding his powers, by living productively; and that only constant vigilance, activity and effort can keep us from failure in the one task that matters—the full development of our powers without the limitations set by the laws of our existence ... to be himself and for himself to achieve happiness by the full realization of those faculties which are peculiarly his—of reason, love and productive work."[8]
Fromm's "productive orientation" was "a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all realms of human experience. It covers mental, emotional and sensory responses to others, to oneself and to things. Productiveness is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him ... he must be free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers ... he can make use of his powers only if he knows what they are, how to use them and what to use them for ... they [must not be] masked and alienated from him."[8]
That man's conation, productivity, character or mode of doing comes in modes that are both instinctive and distinctive has also been a prevalent thought among philosophers and psychologists. Michael Malone in his book "Psychetypes" said,
"One of the ways a person can become neurotic (that is, unable to realize his own potentialities) is by failing to develop his natural typology. Furthermore, it is difficult for people to develop happily when their natural typology is not recognized or respected by others. By providing a language for experience, a theory of psychetypes enables us to communicate across our typological worlds and thereby come to understand and accept the validity of our differences."[8]
In "Endeavors in Psychology," Henry Murray uses conation to denote each persistent effort (intention, volition, act of willing) to attain a specific goal, saying:
"Conations are perhaps a long integrated series, deriving their force from one or more needs ... the general motivating factor is need—tension—but the chief integrating factor is the conation which directs the organization of muscular and verbal patterns toward the attainment of a definable effect, or subeffect."[9]
Murray goes on to say, "the personality is almost continuously involved in deciding between alternative or conflicting or tendencies or elements ... the most pressing and demanding are conflicts between different conations. Since conations (purposes) derive their energies from needs ... or alternative goal-objects, conations are specific in respect to goal-place or goal-object."[9]
In the late 1940s, Raymond Cattell attempted to explain conational modalities in a complex set he called the "dynamic lattice." What McDougall had called instinct or propensity, Cattell termed an "erg." An erg, Cattell said, was an innate psychological/physical disposition, or inborn disposition, which permits its possessor to acquire reactivity to certain classes of objects more readily than others, to experience a specific emotion in regard to them and to set on a course of action which ceases more completely at a certain specific goal activity. His dynamic lattice analyzes the interconnections among ergs (conative) and sentiments (affective) to show purposive sequences.[10]
His philosophy of dynamic psychology stressed the importance of motivation or fundamental energy in psychic life. Only by looking at man in dynamic rather than static conditions did he feel conation could play its appropriate role.

Find May 24, 2011/ Margith Strand

Abstract:


This paper will seek to explore the possibilities of linking content analysis with discursive approaches, as applicable to research conducted in the field of International Relation (IR). The point of departure is the critique of content analysis stemming from discourse analytical approaches, and the tendency to couple content analysis with often only vague discussions of context. The paper will attempt to take a more pragmatic approach to this problem, based on the notion that although meaning is fluid, it can nonetheless be captured at a certain point in time. By engaging in a commensurable conversation between content and discourse analysis, the authors seek to tackle the hermeneutical circle following a Gadamerian approach. This conversation finally leads to a method in which the (idea) categories for studying the texts and
co-texts are developed inductively, while the analytical categories used to incorporate the context of text production and reception are established deductively. The result is what the authors choose to call "context-sensitive" content analysis. Relying on peer review as its source of validity, it will be argued that such an approach may lead to more constructive results for the type of texts (defined in a conventional sense) students and researchers in the field of IR engage with.

Margith Strand / Commercial Copyright Initiation/ January 2011

The material in this Blog [Systems Analysis] by Margith Strand is undergoing commercial copyright protection at this time.

Transcendental Distance Education and Humanism:) Margith Strand/Fielding Graduate University/2011/2010/2009/2008/2007/2006/2005/2004

Transcendental and Humanism...my themes:)

Transcendental Distance Education and Humanism.

Margith Strand

Symbolic Convergence/wikipedia/list of stages

Stage 1: Creation
Stage 2: Consciousness-Raising
Stage 3: Consciousness-Sustaining
Stage 4: Vision-Declining
Stage 5: Vision Implosion


Bibliography

Ernest G. Bormann, (1972). Fantasy and rhetorical vision: The rhetorical criticism of social reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58, 396-407.
Ernest G. Bormann, John F. Cragan, & Donald C. Shields (1994). In defense of symbolic convergence theory: A look at the theory and its criticisms after two decades. Communication Theory, 4, 259-294.
Ernest G. Bormann, John F. Cragan, & Donald C. Shields (1996). An expansion of the rhetorical vision concept of symbolic convergence theory: The cold war paradigm case. Communication Monographs, 63, 1-28.
Ernest G. Bormann, John F. Cragan, & Donald C. Shields (2001). Three decades of developing, grounding, and using symbolic convergence theory. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 25 (pp. 271–313). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum and the International Communication Association.
Ernest G. Bormann, John F. Cragan, & Donald C. Shields (2003). Defending symbolic convergence theory from an imaginary Gunn. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 89, 366-372.
John F. Cragan, & Donald C. Shields (1995). Symbolic theories in applied communication research: Bormann, Burke, and Fisher. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.

Convergence vs Coordination..Margith Strand/ January 10, 2011

Convergence vs Coordination....

[Distance Education]

Ethos

Ethos Meaning and Definition
1. (n.) The character, sentiment, or disposition of a community or people, considered as a natural endowment; the spirit which actuates manners and customs; also, the characteristic tone or genius of an institution or social organization.
2. (n.) The traits in a work of art which express the ideal or typic character -- character as influenced by the ethos (sense 1) of a people -- rather than realistic or emotional situations or individual character in a narrow sense; -- opposed to pathos.

Time-Space Compression....efficiency?

Time-space compression

Time-space compression is a term used to describe processes that seem to accelerate the experience of time and reduce the significance of distance during a given historical moment. Geographer David Harvey used the term in The Condition of Postmodernity, where it refers to "processes that . . . revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time"

Wikipedia

Efficiency/Control and Coordination/ placed by Margith Strand/ January 9, 2011

Abstract

Recent work presented at CHI �98 (Computer Human Interaction) included two papers (Wang et al. 1998; Zhai and Milgram 1998) on the topic of measuring human coordination between translational and rotational degrees of freedom. While both papers are attempts at measuring human coordination, the two methods, simultaneity and efficiency are quite different. Both methods are reviewed and it is argued that neither of these two metrics alone entirely captures the concept of coordination. Rather, a true measure of coordination must take into account performance in both the time domain and the space domain. Simultaneity and efficiency each alone only captures one of the two dimensions which encompasses human coordination. A qualitative definition of coordination is proposed and is compared to the related concepts of simultaneity, efficiency, performance, and control.

Introduction: Previous Work on Human Coordination

This paper is hardly a complete review of all previous work on the topic of coordination; rather it is a review of recent papers from the human computer interaction literature. The emphasis is upon the methods used in each paper to quantify coordination. First, two papers, one measuring simultaneity and one measuring the efficiency of users ability to coordinate movement between translational and rotational degrees of freedom, will be reviewed and contrasted. Rather than arguing that simultaneity or inefficiency are incorrect measures of coordination, it is argued that each alone is an incomplete measure.

Simultaneity (Wang et al. 1998)

Wang et al.�s work is an extension of (Jacob et al. 1994) work on the integrality and separability of input devices. Integrality refers to the ability to move diagonally across a multi-dimensional space, while separability describes movement along one degree of freedom at a time. In other words, shortest distance straight-line Euclidean trajectories are evidence of integral movements while "city-block" trajectories are evidence of separable movements, see Figure 1.



Figure 1. Depiction of integral and separable movements. The degrees of freedom "X" and "Y" may represent any two degrees of freedom that are being manipulated.

For a given timeline, it is possible to compute the ratio of Euclidean to city-block movements for a given task. This ratio is a measure of the integrality of a given input device (Jacob et al. 1994), which can then be compared to the integrality ratio of other input devices for the same task. The higher the ratio, the greater the integrality of the device. One example of the use of this measurement has been to demonstrate that users can control three degrees of freedom simultaneously in a two translational and one rotational degree of freedom device, the Rockin�Mouse (Balakrishman et al. 1997).

Essentially, integrality is a measure of the simultaneity of motion among multiple degrees of freedom. The Jacob et al. method of measuring integration looks at movement that is greater than a fixed threshold in order to filter out very small movements. Other than the fixed threshold, integration/ simultaneity is measurement in the time domain only, and says nothing about magnitude or the direction of the movement. Neither Jacob et al. nor Wang et al. has made the claim that integrality is a measure of coordination. However, they are clearly related concepts. Exactly how does integrality differ from an "ideal" measure of coordination (which has yet to be defined)?

Selecting different constants for the different threshold parameters in the integration measure can lead to different results. Ideally, a measure of coordination should not be a function of constants chosen by the experimenter.
Just because there is motion in all degrees of freedom does not necessarily mean that the motion is contributing towards reaching the goal. For example, randomly generated movements above the threshold would qualify as integrated motion but should not be consider as coordinated motion.
Sometimes not moving in one degree of freedom is just as important as movement in another degree of freedom. It is possible to imagine a task where city-block motion is required for all or part of the task. The measure of integration is independent of the task, it only checks whether there is motion in more one dimension regardless of whether that motion is required or not. A measure of coordination should be a function of the task. (Consider, for example, motion in a circle within an environment which has two degrees of freedom. The amount of movement on each degree of freedom will range from zero to maximum, and only a task dependent measure of coordination can possibly track these changes in magnitude.)

Time Space Compression

time-space compression

\'Processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves\' (Harvey, 1989). Consistent with his vision of historico-geographical materialism, Harvey treats time-space compression primarily as the product of what Marx (and other nineteenth-century writers) identified as the compulsion to \'annihilate space by time\' under capitalism, shaped by the rules of commodity production and capital accumulation. Harvey explained that he deliberately used the word \'compression\' because \'a strong case can be made that the history of capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of life, while so overcoming barriers that the world sometimes seems to collapse in upon us\'. As this suggests, the concept of time-space compression is intended to have an experiential dimension that is missing from concepts of time-space convergence and time-space distanciation. Harvey pays particular attention to the ways in which time-space compression dislocates the habitus that gives social life its (precarious) coherence: implicated in a crisis of representation, its consequences are alarming, disturbing, threatening; a \'maelstrom\' and a \'tiger\', time-space compression under the sign of capitalist modernity induces \'foreboding\', \'shock\', a \'sense of collapse\' and, ultimately, \'terror\' that translates into a \'crisis of identity\' (Harvey, 1989, 1990, 1996, pp. 242-7).

Harvey\'s description of the experience of time-space compression in these terms conjures up the sublime. The sense of being overwhelmed by the scale and sheer power of the world was a persistent motif in modern Western aesthetics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: in the sublime \'we are forcibly reminded of the limits of our dwarfish imaginations and admonished that the world as infinite totality is not ours to know\' (Eagleton, 1990, p. 89). The sublime reappears in late twentieth-century postmodern thought, wherein the Marxist critic F. Jameson (1991) memorably despairs at \'the suppression of distance\' and the \'perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening mediations have been removed\'.

Source:GeoDZ Encyclopedia/2011

Agency and Power/Placed by Margith Strand

Agency and Power:

CONF 730: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT

Professor Ho-Won Jeong
George Mason University
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution



Relation between action and power: the possibility of acting or refraining from acting in the world: capability to 'make a difference.' Is power the property of the individual or the community? In duality of structure it is both. Resources are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction. Resources are the media through which power is exercised.

Structure and Structuration: core-structure, structuration and duality of structure

Structure: properties allowing the binding of space-time in social systems-allow for similarity across space and time. Deeply embedded properties are structural principles, the greatest of which are institutions.

Rules imply methodological procedures of social interaction: two aspects-constitution of meaning and sanctioning of modes of conduct. Rules are techniques and generalized procedures of applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices-the very core of knowledgeability. "the discursive formulation of a rule is already an interpretation of it." (p.23)-sustaining ontological security. The structuring quality of rules is the forming, sustaining, termination and reforming of encounters. Rules and resources are recursively involved in institutions.

Social reproduction is not necessarily social cohesion.

Duality of structure: (p. 25) agents and structures are not two independently given phenomena, a dualism, but a duality.
Structure: sets of rules and resources; connection with those physically absent.

System: reproduced relations organized as social practices, requires co-presence.

Structuration: continuity and transformation of structures.

Competent members of society are vastly skilled in the practical accomplishments of social activities and are expert sociologists. But human knowledgeability is always bounded, plus, the flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by the actors, and these UC may form unacknowledged conditions of action.

(p. 29) "forms of institutions"-modalities of structuration-enable to 'go on' in a form of life.

Interlacing of meaning, norms and power. Interpretive schemes are the modes of typification in forma of life.

Structure signification domination legitimation

Modality interpretive facility norm
Scheme

Interaction communication power sanction

(problem : most theories focus on ONE aspect only)
(problem: must include accountability: capacity to say "no")

p.33

Time, the Body and Encounters

Symbolic Convergence Theory/ Apply to Dissertation/ Margith Strand/Distance Education/January 9, 2011

Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT) is a general communication theory. SCT explains that meanings, emotions, values, and the motives for action are in the rhetoric that is co-created by people trying to make sense out of a common experience, such as university life. SCT posits that students talk about their shared experiences, like a professor they have had in class. During such discussions, a rhetorical fantasy might chain out about a professor that will bring the teacher into dramatic life acting in a classroom scene, often in humorous ways. A professor might be called "The Red Pheasant" because he has red hair and bobs his head like a pheasant going down a corn row. Or the professor might be called "The Candy Lady" because she brings treats to class.

SCT is a general communication theory because it explains that such fantasy-chaining by people about a common experience produces a rhetorical vision in all communities. Just as students co-create university dramas, so, too, do marines, police officers, firefighters, and members of any organization. SCT argues that people inherently co¬create their own symbolic reality (in the Lacanian sense) into a stable rhetorical form that can be studied and understood. SCT calls these stable forms of viewing the world (that evolve through human talk), rhetorical visions. These rhetorical visions contain one of three underlying or under-girding master analogues (Righteous, Pragmatic, and Social).

Wikipedia

Knowledge Ecology/ January 9, 2011

Knowledge ecology
Main article: Knowledge ecology

Knowledge ecology is a concept originating from knowledge management and that aimed at "bridging the gap between the static data repositories of knowledge management and the dynamic, adaptive behavior of natural systems" [2], and in particular relying on the concept of interaction and emergence. Knowledge ecology, and its related concept information ecology has been elaborated by different academics and practitioners such as Thomas H. Davenport [3], Bonnie Nardi[4], or Georges Pór.

Wikipedia

Comment/Dissertation/Margith Strand/January 8, 2011

Today's Blog inputs were solely researched for its sequence and informational value [Dissertation: Margith Strand/F.G.U.]by Margith Strand.

Writing is....

Sometimes intertextuality is taken as plagiarism as in the case of Spanish writer Lucía Etxebarria whose poem collection Estación de infierno (2001) was found to contain metaphors and verses from Antonio Colinas. Etxebarria claimed that she admired him and applied intertextuality.

Some examples of intertextuality in literature include:
• East of Eden (1952) by John Steinbeck: A retelling of the story of Genesis, set in the Salinas Valley of Northern California.
• Ulysses (1918) by James Joyce: A retelling of Homer's Odyssey, set in Dublin.
• The Dead Fathers Club (2006) by Matt Haig: A retelling of Shakespeare's Hamlet, set in modern England.
• A Thousand Acres (1991) by Jane Smiley: A retelling of Shakespeare's King Lear, set in rural Iowa.
• Perelandra (1943) by C. S. Lewis: Another retelling of the story of Genesis, also leaning on Milton's Paradise Lost, but set on the planet Venus.

Transcending/Transcendence..placed by Margith Strand/ January 8, 2011:)

. Does the sociological analysis go beyond our taken-for-granted assumptions about the established reality? Does the analysis extend our knowledge of the established reality, totality (Lukacs, 1971), or totalization (Sartre, 1963) by transcending it, that is by making it an understood part of a larger whole? Even conventional positivist sociology would usually agree to the criterion of transcendence. For what is sociology if it does not go beyond the taken-for-granted assumptions of the status quo...just another form of journalism with more statistical data? Transcendence of the status quo should be a criterion of all sociology worthy of that name.

The criterion of transcendence may be thought of as the degree to which the analysis uncovers the potential for social change and human liberation inherent in any social institution. The "unactualized potential" of a social system implicitly acknowledges that social change is continuous.
A second criterion for judging the truth of a theory is praxis, or the degree to which sociological analysis is responsible to human values (Habermas, 1971). Praxis is the key concept that differentiates the critical sociologist from the ahistorical gatherer of "common sense facts" and cataloguer of mathematical abstractions whose activities characterize contemporary sociological positivism. Praxis refers to the ideal of conscious practical action--of making the critique of alienation speak for popular needs and lead to concrete actions against the capitalist commodity relationships--within historical possibilities. Knowledge serves "real world" interests whether it is encyclopedic (Foucault, 1970) knowledge aimed at cataloguing the status quo so that someone else may act to maintain it as in the case of sociological positivism, or contemplative (Kirkpatrick, 1973) knowledge which assumes a special status from which to view social reality, status that claims to be apart from that reality. Sociology is part of society, and does not objectively stand above it. No matter what pains are taken for "objective value-free analysis," (Weber, 1949) knowledge cannot be divorced from social reality and values.

Source: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIOLOGICAL POSITIVISM (excerpt from)

Under Positivism and Structural Functionalism..placed by Margith Strand/ January 8, 2011

2. Concepts for analyzing society beginning with individual actor and building in stages to the social system

a. individual actor
status-role= the basic structure governing the individual s participation in a social system; a status is a position in a system of relationships; a role is the behavior expected of someone in a given status

b. interaction
pattern variables= the culturally derived orientations guiding how individuals
relate to each other in given status-roles; there are five pattern variables and each presents two mutually exclusive alternatives to basic questions a person faces in orienting to another person

affective vs. affective neutrality
diffuseness vs. specificity
ascription vs. achievement
particularism vs. universalism
collectivity vs. self

Ideas for Margith Strand to place into Dissertation/Distance Education

Thank you, Fielding...

Kant's Theory of Judgment/ To be used in Dissertation/ Margith Strand/ Fielding

Kant's Theory of Judgment

First published Wed Jul 28, 2004; substantive revision Thu Apr 23, 2009
Theories of judgment bring together fundamental issues in semantics, logic, philosophical psychology, epistemology, and action theory: indeed, the notion of judgment is central to any theory of human rationality. But Kant's theory of judgment differs sharply from many other theories of judgment, both traditional and contemporary, in three ways: (1) by taking the capacity for judgment to be the central cognitive faculty of the human mind, (2) by insisting on the semantic, logical, psychological, epistemic, and practical priority of the propositional content of a judgment, and (3) by systematically embedding judgment within the metaphysics of transcendental idealism . Several serious problems are generated by the interplay of the first two factors with the third. This in turn suggests that the other two parts of Kant's theory of judgment can be logically detached from his transcendental idealism and defended independently of it.

•1. The Nature of Judgment
◦1.1 The power of judgment and the other faculties of cognition
◦1.2 Judgments are essentially propositional cognitions
◦1.3 Judgments, objective validity, objective reality, and truth
◦1.4 Judging, believing, and scientific knowing
•2. Kinds of Judgments
◦2.1 Kinds of logical form
◦2.2 Kinds of propositional content
•3. The Metaphysics of Judgment: Transcendental Idealism
◦3.1 Judgment, transcendental idealism, and truth
◦3.2 Is Kant a verificationist?
•4. Problems and Prospects
◦4.1 The bottom-up problem: non-conceptual intuitions, rogue objects, and the gap in the B Deduction
◦4.2 The top-down problem: judgment, transcendental affinity, and the systematic unity of nature
◦4.3 The dream-skeptical problem: judgment, problematic idealism, and the gap in the Second Analogy
◦4.4 Conclusion: judgment without transcendental idealism?
•Bibliography
•Other Internet Resources
•Related Entries

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