Tuesday, July 26, 2011

Motivational Processes in CSILE-Based Learning Posted by Margith A Strand/ July 26, 2011

Motivational Processes in CSILE-Based Learning
Marjaana Rahikainen1, Sanna Järvelä2 & Hanna Salovaara2
1Centre for Learning Research, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland
2Department of Teacher Education, University of Oulu, P.O. Box 2000, 90401 Oulu, Finland
Tel: +358 50 331 4173, Fax: +358 2 333 8497

Email: marahi@utu.fi, sjarvela@ktk.oulu.fi, hsalovaa@ktk.oulu.fi

Abstract: The purpose of the present study was to describe motivational processes in a situation
of computer supported collaborative learning (CSCL). The study focused on examining whether
students representing different motivational orientations would be able to productively function in
a CSCL environment in which self-regulation and collaborative inquiry were encouraged. Coping
with the new learning environments may be very demanding for a student because he or she has a
new cognitive relationship with tasks as well as with the teacher. Two case studies are described
and analyzed in order to demonstrate students' motivational interpretations in a CSILE-based
progressive inquiry project. The results of these case studies indicate that there were no
considerable changes in students' motivational orientations, but students self-reported orientations
corresponded to their actual engagement.
Keywords: motivation, distributed learning environments, computer-mediated communication
Introduction
The purpose of the present study was to describe motivational processes in situation of computer supported
collaborative learning (CSCL). Many promises have been made for optimizing student motivation and interest in
learning in novel environments being proposed. However, there are not many studies reporting what it really means
to engage in computer supported collaborative activities which do not follow the traditional teacher-centred schema
of goal setting and classroom activities (Järvelä, Niemivirta & Hakkarainen, 1999). Further, several recent research
projects indicate that in order to facilitate purposeful and in-depth learning, it is important to foster research-like
processes of inquiry in education (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993; Brown & Campione, 1996). Characteristic of this
kind of learning is that new knowledge is not assimilated as such, but constructed through solving problems of
understanding (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993, Hakkarainen & Lipponen, 1998). Engagement in progressive inquiry
presupposes very strong self-regulative efforts and provides a significant motivational challenges for students.
The Systemic Approach on Learning and Motivation
On the basis of goal theories (Ames, 1992; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) this study broadens existing
perspectives and moves toward to a systemic approach (Lehtinen et al., 1995). A systemic approach sees an
individual student's learning situation as a phenomenon where not only goals, but also learner's prior learning
experiences and teacher-student-interaction affect the long-term development of learning activities. A model of
students' adaptation and motivational orientation to learning and performance situation has been constructed in order
to analyze parallel motivational, affective and cognitive aspects of students' adaptation in instructional settings. The
different orientations describe those universal motivational tendencies, which dominate what kind of goals a student
tries to reach at in a learning situation as well as what kind of situation specific coping strategies he or she will use
to accomplish those goals. (Lehtinen et al., 1995).
Process-Oriented Methods for Motivation Research
Earlier studies have shown how motivation can be improved by classroom changes, such as using
meaningful and differentiated tasks, building on students' interests, and using collaborative learning activities (e.g.,
Ames, 1992). However, these studies were based on a very conventional model of instruction, and as such the
embedded principles may not work in new, constructivist learning environments. It is important to clarify what kind
of motivational presuppositions and optimal conditions the new learning environments have. Innovative learning
environments provide not only challenges but new possibilities for sociocognitive and socioemotional goal
reconstructing (Järvelä, Niemivirta, & Hakkarainen, 1999). Thus research methods are needed that focus on how
goals are transformed into action -- that is, which gather interpret data on the dynamic interplay of personal beliefs,
situational interpretations and subsequent actions.
ICLS 2000 50
Rahikainen, M., Jarvela, S., & Salovaara, H. (2000). Motivational Processes in
CSILE-Based Learning. In B. Fishman & S. O'Connor-Divelbiss (Eds.),
Fourth International Conference of the Learning Sciences (pp. 50-51). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Participants and Methods
The aim of this study was to describe motivational processes of groups of students in CSCL. This poster
describes two, case studies of a three-year follow-up series of investigations concerning primary and secondary
school students' motivational orientations in CSCL in which they were conducting a progressive inquiry project. In
the first case study 18, seventh grade secondary school students (mostly aged 12) used CSILE (Computer-Supported
Intentional Learning Environments; see Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1993) to study the theme of "racism". The project
lasted for six weeks and the students had project lessons (each lasting for 75 minutes) three times a week. The
participants of the second study were 21 primary school students (mostly aged 10), who conducted a four-week
progressive inquiry project (total 24 hours) supported by CSILE. The domain of the project was biology ("How a
mammal adapts to its environment").
In the both studies the students were administered self-report questionnaires to identify their motivational
tendencies and learning strategies at the beginning of the learning project (Niemivirta, 1998). In order to compare
the students' general motivational tendencies with their actual engagement, the lessons were videotaped in Study 2,
to collect data on the students' learning and social interaction processes. In Study 1, process interviews were
conducted in order to identify the students' interpretations of the learning processes. For detailed descriptions of the
methods and analysis see Järvelä, Rahikainen, Salovaara, Lipponen and Niemivirta, 2000.
Outcomes
The results of these case studies indicated that there were not considerable changes in students'
motivational orientations, but students' self-reported orientations corresponded to their actual engagement.
Qualitative data, especially interviews, showed how individual and contextual information is necessary to
understand how to support students' engagement in challenging academic work. The process-oriented methods used
in these studies made it possible for investigators to get a holistic picture of the motivational processes. Further, the
studies revealed that the students with non-learning orientation had difficulties coping with the new learning
situation. These non-learning-oriented students adapted quite slowly the working procedure of progressive inquiry.
One possible reason could be the unstructured nature of the learning situation and lack of obvious goals posed by the
teacher. The results support the assumption that important information for developing new learning environments
and pedagogical solutions is obtained if research goes beyond survey results to use observational data to examine
specifically and directly how students' interpret situations that affect learning.
References
Ames, C. (1992). Classrooms: goals, structures, and motivation. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 261-271.
Brown, A. L. & Campione, J. C. (1996). Psychological theory and the design of innovative learning environments:
On procedures, principles , and systems. In L. Schauble. & R. Glaser (Eds.) Innovations in learning. New
environments for education. (pp. 289-325). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Dweck, C. & Leggett, E. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review,
95, 256-273.
Hakkarainen, K. & Lipponen, L. (1998). Epistemology of inquiry and computer supported collaborative learning. A
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Research Association (AERA), San Diego, April,
1998.
Järvelä, S., Niemivirta, M.& Hakkarainen, K. (1999). The interaction of students' self-reported motivation and
strategies and situational motivation and action during a computer supported collaborative learning project.
Submitted.
Järvelä, S., Rahikainen, M., Salovaara, H., Lipponen, L. & Niemivirta, M. (2000). Students’ motivation in CSCL:
How different students cope with knowledge building challenges and possibilities. An unpublished
manuscript.
Lehtinen, E., Vauras, M., Salonen, P., Olkinuora, E., & Kinnunen, R. (1995). Long-term development of learning
activity: Motivational, cognitive and social interaction. Educational Psychologist, 30, 21-35.
Niemivirta, M. J. (1998). Individual differences in motivational and cognitive factors affecting self-regulated
learning — A pattern-oriented approach. In P. Nenniger, R. S. Jäger, A. Frey, & M. Wosnitza (Eds.)
Advances in motivation (pp. 23-42). Landau: Verlag Empirische Pädagogik.
Scardamalia, M. & Bereiter, C. (1993). Computer-support for knowledge building communities. Journal of the
Learning Sciences, 3, 265-283.
51 ICLS 2000

From: Cognitive Networks: Adaptation and Learning to Achieve End-to-End Performance Objectives

Cognitive Networks: Adaptation and
Learning to Achieve End-to-End
Performance Objectives


ABSTRACT
In this article we advance the idea of a cognitive
network, capable of perceiving current network
conditions and then planning, learning, and
acting according to end-to-end goals. Cognitive
networks are motivated by the complexity, heterogeneity,
and reliability requirements of
tomorrow’s networks, which are increasingly
expected to self-organize to meet user and application
objectives. We compare and contrast cognitive
networks with related research on
cognitive radios and cross-layer design. By defining
cognitive networks, examining their relationship
to other technologies, discussing critical
design issues, and providing a framework for
implementation, we aim to establish a foundationsize of the system state space, wireless networks
are a natural focus of research in complex
networks. Previous wireless research into
cognitive radio and crosslayer design have
addressed some of these issues, but have shortcomings
from the network perspective. Cognitive
networks represent a new scope and
approach to dealing with this complexity. This
article is written to provide the reader with a
primer on the cognitive network concept, as
envisioned by the authors. As such, it begins by
first explaining the need for cognitive networks,
how they are defined, and possible
applications for the technology. Then the article
examines how cognitive networks are related
to, but distinct from, previous work in
cognitive radios and cross-layer design. A practical
discussion of the implementation of a cognitive
network and important areas of future
work closes the article.

DEFINITION
We suggest the following definition for a cognitive
network, first described by us in [1]: A cognitive
network is a network with a cognitive
process that can perceive current network conditions,
and then plan, decide, and act on those
conditions. The network can learn from these
adaptations and use them to make future decisions,
all while taking into account end-to-end
goals.

The cognitive aspect of this definition is similar
to that used to describe cognitive radio and
broadly encompasses many simple models of
cognition and learning. More critical to the definition
are the network and end-to-end aspects.
Without the network and end-to-end scope, the
system is perhaps a cognitive radio or layer, but
not a cognitive network. Here, end-to-end
denotes all the network elements involved in the
transmission of a data flow. For a unicast transmission,
this might include the subnets, routers,
switches, virtual connections, encryption
schemes, mediums, interfaces, or waveforms, to
mention just a few. The end-to-end goals are
what gives a cognitive network its network-wide
scope, separating it from other adaptation
approaches, which have only a local, single element
scope.

Ryan W. Thomas, Daniel H. Friend, Luiz A. DaSilva, and Allen B. MacKenzie, Virginia Tech

REFERENCES
[1] R. W. Thomas, L. A. DaSilva, and A. B. Mackenzie,
“Cognitive Networks,” Proc. IEEE DySPAN 2005, Nov.
2005, pp. 352–60.
[2] J. Mitola, Cognitive Radio: An Integrated Agent Architecture
for Software Defined Radio, Ph.D. thesis, Royal
Inst. Technology, 2000.
[3] V. Srivastava and M. Motani, “Cross-Layer Design: A
Survey and the Road Ahead,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol.
43, no. 12, 2005, pp. 112–19.
[4] V. Kawadia and P. R. Kumar, “A Cautionary Perspective[5] D. D. Clark et al., “A Knowledge Plane for the Internet,”
Proc. SIGCOMM ’03, New York, NY, 2003, pp. 3–10.
[6] D. Bourse et al., “End-to-End Reconfigurability (E2R II):
Management and Control of Adaptive Communication
Systems,” IST Mobile Summit 2006, June 2006.
[7] P. Demestichas et al., “m@ANGEL: Autonomic Management
Platform for Seamless Cognitive Connectivity to
the Mobile Internet,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 44, no.
6, June 2006, pp. 118–27.
[8] P. Sutton, L. E. Doyle, and K. E. Nolan, “A Reconfigurable
Platform for Cognitive Networks,” Proc. CROWNCOM
2006, 2006.
[9] P. Mähönen et al., “Cognitive Wireless Networks: Your
Network Just Became a Teenager,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM
2006, 2006.
[10] P. N. Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988.
[11] J. Jin and K. Nahrstedt, “QoS Specification Languages for
Distributed Multimedia Applications: A Survey and Taxonomy,”
IEEE Multimedia, vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, pp. 74–87.
[12] C. H. Papadimitriou, “Algorithms, Games, and the
Internet,” Proc. STOC 2001, 2001.
[13] M. A. L. Thathachar and P. S. Sastry, Networks of
Learning Automata, Kluwer, 2004.

Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness. Contributors: Andrew Tallon - author. Publisher: Fordham University Press. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: *.

Chapter 1

Phenomenology, Intentionality, Embodiment


Exalt not thy heart, that it be not brought low. Ptah-Hotep, Instruction, no. 25 (c. 3550 B.C.)

The human heart is more dangerous than mountains and rivers, more difficult to understand than Heaven itself. Chuang-Tze, Philosophy, ch. 11. ( 400 B.C.).

The heart perceives that which the eye cannot see. Algazali (1059-1111), Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 21, maxim 38 (c. 1100).

Summary

First, we note the general idea of phenomenology as descriptive philosophy and distinguish two kinds of phenomenology according to the central idea of the phenomenological method: intentionality. Second, we begin to move from the physical and psychical space between persons toward the center of consciousness. Third, we show how embodiment, especially in motion, manifests its own affective intentionality. The possibility of affective intentionality is established in this chapter, as is the sense of the embodied, felt intentionality of the space between persons, setting the general context for triune consciousness.

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Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts

Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts
Glenn A. Bowen

Glenn A. Bowen, PhD, Director of Service Learning, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, North Carolina, USA

Abstract: Grounded theory is a qualitative research approach that uses inductive analysis as a principal technique. Yet, researchers who embrace this approach often use sensitizing concepts to guide their analysis. In this article, the author examines the relationship between sensitizing concepts and grounded theory. Furthermore, he illustrates the application of sensitizing concepts in a study of community-based antipoverty projects in Jamaica. The article contains commentary about trustworthiness techniques, the coding process, and the constant comparative method of analysis, as well as a synopsis of study findings.
Keywords: grounded theory, inductive analysis, naturalistic research, sensitizing concepts, themes, trustworthiness
Author’s note
Thanks to the College of Health and Urban Affairs (School of Social Work) at Florida International University, Miami, USA, for financial assistance toward my participation in a qualitative methods workshop in August 2003. Dr. Deborah Pad- gett (New York University) provided expert guidance during the workshop, organized by the Institute for the Advancement of Social Work Research. Special thanks to my research advisors, Drs. Miriam Potocky-Tripodi, David Cohen, Barbara Thomlison, and Anthony Maingot, for their invaluable support.
Citation
Grounded theory and sensitizing concepts. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(3), Article 2. Retrieved [date] from http://www. ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/5_3/html/bowen.htm

________________________________________
Introduction
Grounded theory is a popular research approach embraced by scholars in anthropology, sociology, health care, and many other fields. Sensitizing concepts provide a theoretical foundation for its development. In this article, I provide an overview of grounded theory and explain the purpose of sensitizing concepts within the context of the research method. Moreover, I illustrate the functions of sensitizing concepts in a study of community-based antipoverty projects, which generated a theory of development-focused stakeholder collaboration. In particular, I examine the relationship between the initial concepts, emergent themes, and the theory itself.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory is a research approach or method that calls for a continual interplay between data collection and analysis to produce a theory during the research process. A grounded theory is derived inductively through the systematic collection and analysis of data pertaining to a phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with one other. Sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967) discovered grounded theory in the 1960s; Strauss and Corbin (who has a nursing research background) are credited with refining the approach.
Inductive Analysis
Inductive analysis is the principal technique used in the grounded theory method. “Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis” (Patton, 1980, p. 306).
Grounded theory is a very popular method in nursing research (see, e.g., Beck, 1993; Knobf, 2002; Marcellus, 2005; Nathaniel, 2006; O’Connell & Irurita, 2000). Over the years, scholars in many other fields have embraced this research approach. Student affairs professionals, for instance, view grounded theory as a powerful research method that can produce information to increase educators’ understanding of the complex interactions between students and college environments (Brown, Stevens, Troiano, & Schneider, 2002).
Themes
A grounded theory is generated by themes, and themes emerge from the data during analysis, capturing the essence of meaning or experience drawn from varied situations and contexts. According to Morse and Field (1995),
Thematic analysis involves the search for and identification of common threads that extend throughout an entire interview or set of interviews. Themes are usually quite abstract and therefore difficult to identify. Often the theme does not immediately “jump out” of the interview but may be more apparent if the researcher steps back and considers. “What are these folks trying to tell me?” The theme may be beneath the surface of the interviews but, once identified, appears obvious. Frequently, these themes are concepts indicated by the data rather than concrete entities directly described by the participants. . . . Once identified, the themes appear to be significant concepts that link substantial portions of the interviews together. (pp. 139-140, emphasis in original)
Although Morse and Field focused on interviews, a variety of data sources may be tapped in a grounded theory study. As the researcher analyzes the data, major themes are expected to emerge and to be categorized in such a way that they yield a theory.
Sensitizing concepts
In this section, I define and explain the purpose of sensitizing concepts within the context of grounded theory. The term originated with Blumer (1954), the late American sociologist, who contrasted definitive concepts with sensitizing concepts. Blumer explained,
A definitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the aid of a clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed bench marks. . . . A sensitizing concept lacks such specification of attributes or bench marks and consequently it does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look. (p. 7)
Social researchers now tend to view sensitizing concepts as interpretive devices and as a starting point for a qualitative study (Glaser, 1978; Padgett, 2004; see also Patton, 2002). Sensitizing concepts draw attention to important features of social interaction and provide guidelines for research in specific settings. According to Gilgun (2002), “Research usually begins with such concepts, whether researchers state this or not and whether they are aware of them or not” (p. 4).
Sociologist Charmaz (2003) has referred to sensitizing concepts as “those background ideas that inform the overall research problem” and stated further,
Sensitizing concepts offer ways of seeing, organizing, and understanding experience; they are embedded in our disciplinary emphases and perspectival proclivities. Although sensitizing concepts may deepen perception, they provide starting points for building analysis, not ending points for evading it. We may use sensitizing concepts only as points of departure from which to study the data. (p. 259, emphasis in original)
For his part, Blaikie (2000) has argued that research that is concerned with theory generation might require sensitizing concepts but no hypotheses. Indeed, qualitative research, including grounded theory research, does not start with hypotheses or preconceived notions. Instead, in accordance with its inductive nature, it involves the researcher’s attempts to discover, understand, and interpret what is happening in the research context.
Sensitizing concepts can be tested, improved, and refined (Blumer, 1954). However, researchers taking the grounded theory path do not necessarily seek to test, improve, or refine such a concept. They might use sensitizing concepts simply to lay the foundation for the analysis of research data. Researchers might also use sensitizing concepts in examining substantive codes with a view to developing thematic categories from the data. For example, MacIntosh (2003) reported that in the process of substantive coding, she used sensitizing concepts in further data collection and analysis. Although Macintosh cited Will van den Hoonaard’s (1997) primer, Working with Sensitizing Concepts, her description of the application of sensitizing concepts in the research process is at best vague and inadequate.
It is important to bear in mind that whereas sensitizing concepts might alert researchers to some important aspects of research situations, they also might direct attention away from other important aspects (Gilgun, 2002). In any case, the ultimate survival of a sensitizing concept “depends on where the data take us; emergent concepts may supplement or displace them altogether” (Padgett, 2004, p. 301).
Illustrating sensitizing concepts in a study
I used sensitizing concepts to shape my study of community-based antipoverty projects in Jamaica, which generated a substantive-formal theory of stakeholder collaboration (Bowen, 2003, 2005). It was an exploratory qualitative study of projects supported by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), an autonomous agency of the national government that funds small-scale community improvement projects. In exploratory research, social phenomena are investigated with minimal a priori expectations to develop explanations of these phenomena (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
I collected data primarily by means of in-depth, open-ended interviews involving knowledgeable respondents from community-based organizations or nongovernmental organizations that sponsored social fund projects in each of eight selected communities in Jamaica. Nonparticipant observation of organization/community conditions and products, as well as reviews of available project documents, also produced data for analysis.
The use of sensitizing concepts was appropriate for a study that fit into the framework of “naturalistic” ontology. Naturalistic research includes, among other characteristics, inductive analysis and special criteria of trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In my study of social fund projects, I used an inductive approach to identify patterns and interrelationships in the data by means of thematic codes. The trustworthiness standard in naturalistic research is in contrast to the conventional, positivistic criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In my study, I included such trustworthiness techniques as member checks, negative case analysis, “thick” description of phenomena, and an audit trail, so that the process of theory development would be both visible and verifiable. Ultimately, I was able to produce a plausible and coherent explanation of the phenomena.
Conceptual framework
A conceptual framework links various concepts and serves as an impetus for the formulation of theory (Seibold, 2002). The sensitizing concepts included in my study formed the conceptual framework. These concepts were derived from a thorough review of the literature on social funds, poverty reduction, and community development. The reviewed literature indicated that the basic theoretical argument was that involving local community residents in partnership-based social fund projects could create social capital and foster empowerment of the community, and of lower income people, in particular. Partnership based means that stakeholders from various social sectors—public (government), private (business), and civic (community)—were involved in the funded projects. The concepts of community participation, social capital, and empowerment seemed to underpin social funds as an approach to poverty reduction, and I assumed that these concepts contained theoretical ideas that would help to set the context and direction for my study. Therefore, I decided to examine the nexus among them.
Hence, the conceptual framework for the study included three sensitizing concepts, which formed part of the analysis. I treated these concepts as variables through the specification of procedures to measure them (Blaikie, 2000). The concepts provided an analytic frame, serving as a point of reference and a guide in the analysis of data with theory-producing potential.
Community/citizen participation
Community participation was deemed essential to every phase of a JSIF-funded project—from identifying and preparing the project to managing and evaluating it. Moreover, predetermined criteria for approving the allocation of funds included community participation in all phases of the project and a (minimum) 5% contribution from the local sponsor. In theory, the “demand-driven” approach used by JSIF allowed poor communities to articulate their priority needs and to receive funding for projects selected by the community (Bowen, 2003, p. 27). JSIF claimed to value local knowledge and involvement in the design of projects. This was indicative of a “bottom-up” approach to local development.
According to one report, the Jamaica Social Investment Fund had put “a strong emphasis on using participatory approaches which allow all, young/old, men/women, poor/less poor and those traditionally unseen and unheard to be actively involved” in the JSIF-funded development projects (Jupp, 2000a, p. 2). After reviewing the literature, I concluded that “how such an ‘emphasis’ is translated into action needs to be examined, and how effective this approach really is remains to be seen” (Bowen, 2003, p. 29).
A detailed review of the literature revealed that community participation was often treated as synonymous with citizen participation. Citizen participation is defined as “the active, voluntary engagement of individuals and groups to change problematic conditions and to influence policies and programs that affect the quality of their lives or the lives of others” (Gamble & Weil, 1995, p. 483). Community participation, therefore, was seen as citizen engagement in the change or development process at the community level. In reviewing the literature, I argued, “To the extent that a CBO (community-based organization) truly represents ordinary citizens, the two concepts, community participation and citizen participation, properly merge in relation to a social fund project” (Bowen, 2003, p. 28, italics in original).
The term community participation, or citizen participation, was defined operationally more easily than the other concepts were. In my study, community/citizen participationwas defined as the active involvement of local community residents, and particularly persons identified as poor, in the social fund project and in project-related activities. Genuine participation, and not mere presence, would be indicated by, inter alia, community members’ roles in designing, implementing, monitoring, evaluating, and maintaining the project; sharing of information and contribution of ideas; and contributions to decision making.
Social capital
JSIF projects aimed to create social capital by providing support, training, and opportunities for people to build trust and collaboration within communities (World Bank Group, 2001a). Social capital facilitates cooperation and collective action, necessary factors for the success of JSIF projects (Jupp, 2000b). In an exploratory study, I could not afford to ignore this concept.
Social capital involves norms, social networks, and relationships (Coleman, 1988). It has been described as the glue that holds groups and societies together (Jupp, 2000b). Jupp has described two types of social capital “glue”: (a) “bonding”—the glue within homogeneous groups, which provides help for group members; and (b) “bridging”—the glue that links these groups to other, unlike groups (e.g., linking poor communities to the business sector or utility companies). Several researchers have indicated that social capital was related to poverty alleviation (e.g., Moser & Holland, 1997; Narayan, et al., 2000; Tolbert, Irwin, Lyson, & Nucci, 2002). One illuminating study found a significant relationship between social capital and the probability of escaping poverty (Gray-Molina, Jiménez, Pérez de Rada, & Yáñez, 2001).
Although the literature is replete with references to social capital, this concept remained difficult to define in operational terms. In fact, according to the World Bank, obtaining a “true” measure of social capital is probably not possible (World Bank Group, 2001b). In light of this, many researchers have been using proxy measures. I expected that the most visible proxies for social networks in local Jamaican communities would be parent-teacher associations, citizens’ associations, community councils, youth and sports clubs, and informal or semiformal credit and job networks.
Empowerment
The final concept that seemed to undergird a social fund strategy of poverty reduction was empowerment. A principal objective of the Jamaica Social Investment Fund was to assist in empowering communities by seeking to ensure greater levels of community involvement in development programs and community participation in decision making. JSIF claimed to invest in communities by empowering them and building their capacity to manage their own development more effectively (Jupp, 2000a).
The idea of capacity building has generated considerable interest among community development practitioners and scholars in the United States (McLean et al., 2001). Capacity for local community action appeared to be intertwined with empowerment and was a common theme underlying both community participation and social capital. Community participation is now regarded as an important means by which community capacity can be enhanced (Carvalho et al., 2002); and capacity to engage in effective community development work typically involves some combination of knowledge, skills, commitment, and resources (McLean et al., 2001).
Like community participation, the concept of empowerment is said to have its origin in the fight against poverty (Barry & Sidaway, 1999). An empowered community is one that initiates self-improvement efforts, responds to threats to quality of life, and provides opportunities for citizen participation, according to Zimmerman (2000). In my study, indicators of empowerment were expected to include entrepreneurial activities by local residents, organizational leadership, control of funds, and results of decision-making processes in relation to public and social services.
The second of three questions that I attempted to answer in the study was related to these three sensitizing concepts. The question was this: Does a social fund project (a) foster community/citizen participation, (b) create social capital, and (c) empower the poor—and if so, in what specific ways?
Analysis
A constructivist-interpretive paradigm (Schwandt, 1994) underpinned my study. Accordingly, I analyzed the data using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In line with this approach, my interpretation of events and situations involving local community actors provided building blocks for theory construction. As explained by Glaser and Strauss (1967), comparative analysis can be used to generate two basic kinds of theory: “substantive” and “formal” (p. 32). Substantive theory is developed for a substantive, or empirical, area of sociological inquiry; formal theory is developed for a formal, or conceptual, area of sociological inquiry. Both substantive and formal theories must be grounded in data.
In my study, the substantive (empirical) area of inquiry was poverty, whereas the formal (conceptual) area of inquiry was community/citizen participation, social capital, and empowerment, taken together. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) observed, most studies generating substantive theory will ultimately generate and improve formal theory.
I used the constant comparative method, marked by an iterative process, to identify the latent pattern in multiple participants’ perspectives, as specified primarily in their words. In this regard, I reviewed line, sentence, and paragraph segments of the transcribed interviews and field notes with a view to deciding what codes fit the concepts suggested by the data. The interview data were given more weight in the analysis than were the nonparticipant observation and the document reviews. Each code was constantly compared to all other codes to identify similarities, differences, and general patterns.
Themes gradually emerged as a result of the combined process of my becoming intimate with the data, making logical associations with the interview questions, and considering what was learned during the initial review of the literature. At successive stages, themes moved from a low level of abstraction to become major, overarching themes rooted in the concrete evidence provided by the data. When “theoretical saturation” occurred—that is, when additional data failed to uncover any new ideas about the developing theory—the coding process ended.
Relationship of sensitizing concepts to theory
Four emergent themes together, with a substantive-formal theory of development-focused collaboration, became the major findings of the study. A complete analysis of the data has revealed that the approach to poverty reduction in social fund-supported communities is a process of development-focused collaboration among various stakeholders. The underlying theory posits that collaboration increases the productivity of resources and creates the conditions for community-driven development. “Community-driven development represents a people-centered approach to social change, whereby local actors take the lead in conceptualizing projects and programs that address social and economic needs” (Bowen, 2003, p. 76).
Noting that local actors were also fully involved in implementing such projects and programs, I concluded that stakeholder involvement was a key element of development-focused collaboration (Bowen, 2003, 2005). Furthermore, a major hypothesis embedded in the stakeholder involvement theory is that “the greater the collaboration, the greater the productivity of the resources and the more favorable the conditions for community-driven development” (Bowen, 2005, p. 78).
Communities that received social fund assistance for projects attempted to deal with local-level poverty-related problems by following a four-stage process: (a) Identifying Problems and Priorities, (b) Motivating and Mobilizing, (c) Working Together, and (d) Creating an Enabling Environment. Each stage is regarded as a theme. The first stage (theme) encompasses subthemes that reflect community conditions; the conditions identified at the first stage produced strategies at the second stage of the collaboration process; three forms of interactions comprise the third stage (Working Together); and consequences of social fund projects in beneficiary communities are mirrored at the final stage of the process (see Table 1).
Conditions Identifying Problems and Priorities
Voicing common concerns
Understanding the system
Strategies Motivating and mobilizing
Focusing on the common good
Emphasizing collective responsibility
Seeking stakeholder support
Interactions Working together
Matching resources to requirements
Getting the job done
Showing tangible results
Consequences Creating an enabling environment
Looking beyond the present
Sustaining interest and support
Maintaining pride and satisfaction
Table 1. Stakeholder collaboration theory
For each stage, codes at three levels—open, axial, and selective—were identified, compared and contrasted, and collapsed to produce themes. In analyzing the data, I sought to answer the research question regarding the sensitizing concepts by looking for empirical instances of citizen participation, social capital, and empowerment. The themes outlined above were truly emergent and therefore do not reflect any a priori selection on my part.
What follows is a brief examination of the three sensitizing concepts in relation to the theory of local-level stakeholder collaboration. Each concept is considered in turn.
Community/citizen participation
Social fund projects, according to background documents, have roles for local beneficiary communities in every phase: selection, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. However, in the study, I found that by and large, community participation was limited, if not lacking, in several phases of the funded projects. Participation was highest during project implementation (Bowen, 2003). Yet, community/citizen participation found its way into the theory as part of the third stage of the process of development-focused collaboration, when local project sponsors concentrated on “matching resources to requirements” and “getting the job done.” However, this sensitizing concept was not forced on the data.
Line-by-line coding of the data (and additional data collection after the first round of coding) led to the refinement of the community/citizen participation concept. This initial concept helped me make sense of the data and was integral to the theory-generating analysis. For example, to meet the social fund guidelines for community participation, communities and project sponsors identified money, materials or supplies, personnel, and labor as the available resources. A respondent stated,
Our association tried to pool whatever resources we had available to us. We decided to beg, borrow, or steal—no, we didn’t really steal! However, we asked the business people to support us and we decided to put in as much work as necessary so we could have the project.
Through coding this statement (as well as others) line by line, I linked it to the emerging theme, “Matching Resources to Requirements.” The analysis showed this theme to be part of the third stage of development-focused collaboration, when community associations concentrated on project implementation.
An additional example of line-by-line coding is given in Table 2. The respondent whose four-line statement is quoted was a member of the executive committee of a community-based organization that organized a funded project. The “community involvement” and “people’s responsibility” codes come closest to the community/citizen participation concept identified in the literature.
Social Capital
The findings indicated that social capital formation across communities in the study was not substantial. “Bonding” social capital was evident in all communities, albeit to varying degrees, whereas “bridging” social capital was less evident. Rural communities had higher levels of social capital than urban communities (Bowen, 2003). The main manifestations of social capital included the collective action of citizen groups during the planning and implementation stages of each social fund project as well as in subsequent projects and programs. The findings suggested that leadership roles tend to be distributed mostly among “better off” people in the communities.
The social capital concept per se was not included in the theory. Arguably, however, it was reflected in the concept of collaboration, which turned out to be central to the emergent theory. The literature had indicated that social capital was connected to collaboration, in the sense that social capital is a resource for collective action, and collective action is the essence of collaboration. To be sure, collaborationis defined as “a mutually beneficial relationship between two or more parties to achieve common goals by sharing responsibility, authority and accountability for achieving results” (Chrislip & Larson, 1994, p. 5). The purpose of collaboration is to create a shared vision and joint strategies to address concerns that go beyond the purview of any particular party.
Empowerment
In general, the JSIF-funded projects were more enabling than empowering. “Creating an enabling environment” was identified as the final stage of the process of development-focused collaboration (Bowen, 2003). The state—through its social fund agency, with the assistance of one of JSIF’s partners, the Social Development Commission—created an enabling environment for local communities to get involved in local development processes. In other words, the state created conditions for citizen groups to carry out certain tasks and make certain decisions to deal with specific social or economic problems within a community. However, the projects did not allow the communities to gain power or control resources on their own without further substantial support from public or private institutions or agencies. Therefore, although some activities in social fund beneficiary communities were potentially empowering, there was only minimal empowerment of those communities.
By considering the concept of empowerment in the analysis, I discovered the concept of enablement in relation to the thematic categories identified by the study. Thus, based on my analysis of the data, enablement supplanted empowerment.

Monday, July 25, 2011

Nonaka Organizational ....

Nonaka" (1994) Organizational knowledge creation theory

Some Original Notes by Margith Strand/ Fielding Graduate University/ July 25, 2011

Peircean model of the sign: Peirce's model of the sign had three elements - the representamen, an interpretant and an object. It is thus a triadic model. See also: Saussurean model:the Peircean model appears to be more functional/ May 22, 2011/Margith Strand How do you account for the differentiation in the realization of the abstract to physical reality?The abstract terms hold the key to the physical world and this all seems to be missing in the discussions in the signs and even for the Precians. If we have the concrete, being the doorknob..how do we design the color of the doorknob or decide on the color of the doorknob? This process is the background, the contextual thinking and the Phenomenological-Contextual mechanisms. The connections are a flow of decision making and so the channeling may work here. I may not be looking far enough..the lucid and the luminescence in the brightness:) Intuitively, there is some transcedence going on here in transferring from the abstract to the concrete..I do think, though..it is concrete broken down to generate the abstract...in terms of those "words" that are called "abstract"

Object: Term used in Peirce's triadic model of the sign to describe the referent of the sign - what the sign 'stands for'. Note that unlike Saussure's abstract signified, the referent is an object in the world. This need not exclude the reference of signs to abstract concepts and fictional entities as well as to physical objects, but Peirce's model allocates a place for an physical reality which Saussure's model did not feature (though Peirce was not a naive realist, and argued that all experience is mediated by signs). See also: Peircean model of the signObject is the Structuration (Theory) ??? ergo…Transcendentalism??..spirit of the process..agency and structure..intentionality override…for Constitution of Meaning to hold..check out the logisticsJ I don’t know…I know that the Constitution of Meaning is it…Phenomenology..Spirit of the Meaning is the Constitution..check out the difference in the meaning of this.Term used in Peirce's triadic model of the sign to describe the referent of the sign - what the sign 'stands for'. Note that unlike Saussure's abstract signified, the referent is an object in the world. This need not exclude the reference of signs to abstract concepts and fictional entities as well as to physical objects, but Peirce's model allocates a place for an physical reality which Saussure's model did not feature (though..if the referent of the sign..i.e..what the sign stands for is the object, and the sign stands for the structuration, then …the structuration is the object..so we must define the structuration as a part of the learning structure..do not use the signified and the Saussure’s model..triadic is better because of the interpretant..I am also interested in perception to function for the learning structure of distance education….Parsimony, ontological: See Ontology Perceptual codes: These is classified here as a type of interpretative code. Some semioticians regard sensory perception as a code. Various arguments are encountered, in particular: a) that interpretation cannot be separated from perception; b) that human perceptual apparatus differs from that of other organisms and so presumably different species inhabit different perceptual realities; and/or c) that even within the human species, that there are socio-cultural, sub-cultural and environmental differences in perception. Perceptual codes must thus be learnt. As a semiotic code, perception involves representation. Unlike most codes, the notion of a perceptual code does not assume intentional communication (there need be no 'sender'). See

Nonaka" (1994) Organizational knowledge creation theory

Organizational knowledge creation theory



Acronym

OKC

Alternate name(s)

Theory of knowledge creation, Dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation

Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s)

N/A

Main independent construct(s)/factor(s)

N/A

Concise description of theory

Nonaka’s (1994) dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation holds that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge via four patterns of interactions, socialization, combination, internalization and externalization. Explicit knowledge is codified knowledge transmittable in formal, systematic language whereas tacit knowledge is personalized knowledge that is hard to formalize and communicate and deeply rooted in action, commitment and involvement in context (Polanyi 1962).

Socialization represents the interaction between individuals through mechanisms such as observation, imitation or apprenticeships. Combination involves combining explicit knowledge through meeting and conversation or using information systems. Internalization converts explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge whereas externalization converts tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.

Organizational knowledge creation takes place when all four modes of knowledge conversion form a continual cycle triggered by such actions as team interactions, dialogue, metaphors, coordination, documentation, experimentation, and learning by doing, etc. Organizational knowledge creation can be viewed as an upward spiral process from the individual level to the collective group level, and then to the organizational level, sometimes to the interorganizational level.

Consistent with Nonaka’s dynamic theory of knowledge creation, Cook and Brown (1999) bridge the epistemology of possession with that of practice and suggest that organizational knowledge is created through the generic dancing between knowledge and knowing.

Explicit, tacit, individual and group knowledge are distinct forms of knowledge, each doing work the others cannot. While mere explicit knowledge is insufficient, without explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge conversion becomes a closed loop. While individuals possess part of what is known about a given domain, a body of knowledge is possessed by the organization and is drawn on in its actions, just as knowledge possessed by an individual is drawn on in his or her actions.

Knowing is the epistemic work done as part of action or practice, and is the interaction with the social and physical world, using knowledge as a tool. Knowing is dynamic, concrete and relational. The interplay of knowledge and knowledge can generate new knowledge and new ways of knowing in organizations.

Focusing on the knowedgeability of action connoting action, doing and practice, rather than knowledge connoting things, elements, facts, processes and dispositions, Orlikowski (2002) suggests that organizational knowing is constituted and reconstituted in practice. People engage in organizational practices, reproduce the knowing generated in those practices and reconstitute knowledgeability over time and across contexts.

This view of knowing in practice suggests a mutual constitution of knowing and practice that is depicted by the metaphor of drawing hands, each drawing the other while being drawn, indicating that knowing is an ongoing social accomplishment that is constituted and reconstituted in everyday practice.

Diagram/schematic of theory



Source: Nonaka, 1994



Source: Cook and Brown, 1999

Originating author(s)

Ikujiro Nonaka, Michael Polanyi

Seminal articles

Polanyi M. Tacit Knowing – "Its bearing on some problems of philosophy" Reviews of Modern Physics (34:4) 1962, pp 601-616.

Anderson, J. R. The Architecture of Cognition, 1983, Cambridge, MA” Harvard University Press.

Nonaka, I. "A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation," Organization Science (5:1), Feb 1994, pp 14-37.

Nonaka, I., Umemoto, K., and Senoo, D. "From information processing to knowledge creation: A paradigm shift in business management," Technology in Society (18:2) 1996, pp 203-218.

Cook, S.D.N. & Brown, J. S. Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing. Organization Science, (10:4) 1999, pp. 381-400.

Originating area

Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology, Organizational Theory

Level of analysis

Individual, Group, Organization, Inter-organizational

IS articles that use the theory

Becerra-Fernandez, I. Sabherwal, R. Organizational Knowledge Management: A contingency perspective, Journal of Management Information Systems (18:1), 2001, 23-55.

Bonifacio, M., and Molani, A. "The richness of diversity in knowledge creation: An interdisciplinary overview," Journal of Universal Computer Science (9:6) 2003, pp 491-500.

Bryant, S.E. "The impact of peer mentoring on organizational knowledge creation and sharing - An empirical study in a software firm," Group and Organization Management (30:3), Jun 2005, pp 319-338.

Carrillo, J.E., and Gaimon, C. "Improving manufacturing performance through process change and knowledge creation," Management Science (46:2), Feb 2000, pp 265-288.

Chen, A.N.K., and Edgington, T.M. "Assessing value in organizational knowledge creation: Considerations for knowledge workers," MIS Quarterly (29:2), Jun 2005, pp 279-309.

Donaldson, L. "Reflections on knowledge and knowledge-intensive firms," Human Relations (54:7), Jul 2001, pp 955-963.

Janz, B.D., and Prasarnphanich, P. "Understanding the antecedents of effective knowledge management: The importance of a knowledge-centered culture," Decision Sciences (34:2), Spr 2003, pp 351-384.

Johnson, W.H.A., and Johnston, D.A. "Organizational knowledge creating processes and the performance of university-industry collaborative R&D projects," International Journal of Technology Management (27:1) 2004, pp 93-114.

Knight, G.A., and Liesch, P.W. "Information internalization in internationalizing the firm," Journal of Business Research (55:12), Dec 2002, pp 981-995.

Kodama, M. "New knowledge creation through leadership-based strategic community - a case of new product development in IT and multimedia business fields," Technovation (25:8), Aug 2005, pp 895-908.

Lee, H., and Choi, B. Knowledge management enablers, processes, and organizational performance: An integrative view and empirical examination. Journal of Management Information Systems. 20, 1 (2003), pp, 179-228.

Levin, D.Z., and Cross, R. "The strength of weak ties you can trust: The mediating role of trust in effective knowledge transfer," Management Science (50:11), Nov 2004, pp 1477-1490.

Linderman, K., Schroeder, R.G., Zaheer, S., Liedtke, C., and Choo, A.S. "Integrating quality management practices with knowledge creation processes," Journal of Operations Management (22:6), Dec 2004, pp 589-607.

Malhotra, A; Gosain, S; El Sawy, O. A. "Absorptive capacity configurations in supply chains: Gearing for partner-enabled market knowledge creation," MIS Quarterly (29:1), Mar 2005, pp 145-187.

Massey, AP; Montoya-Weiss, M. M. "Unraveling the temporal fabric of knowledge conversion: A model of media selection and use," MIS Quarterly (30:1), Mar 2006, pp 99-114.

McFadyen, M.A., and Cannella, A.A. "Social capital and knowledge creation: Diminishing returns of the number and strength of exchange relationships," Academy of Management Journal (47:5), Oct 2004, pp 735-746.

Nambisan, S., Agarwal, R., and Tanniru, M. "Organizational mechanisms for enhancing user innovation in information technology," MIS Quarterly (23:3), Sep 1999, pp 365-395.

Nonaka, I., and Konno, N. "The concept of "ba": Building a foundation for knowledge creation," California Management Review (40:3), Spr 1998, pp 40-54.

Nonaka, I., and Toyama, R. "The theory of the knowledge-creating firm: subjectivity, objectivity and synthesis," Industrial and Corporate Change (14:3), Jun 2005, pp 419-436.

Nonaka, I., Takeuchi, H., and Umemoto, K. "A theory of organizational knowledge creation," International Journal of Technology Management (11:7-8) 1996, pp 833-845.

Nonaka, I., Umemoto, K., and Senoo, D. "From information processing to knowledge creation: A paradigm shift in business management," Technology in Society (18:2) 1996, pp 203-218.

Orlikowski, W. J. Knowing in practice: Enacting a collective capability in distributed organizing. Organization Science, (13:3) 2002, pp. 249-273.

Ruiz-Mercader, J., Merono-Cerdan, A.L., and Sabater-Sanchez, R. "Information technology and learning: Their relationship and impact on organizational performance in small businesses," International Journal of Information Management (26:1), Feb 2006, pp 16-29.

Sabherwal, R., and Sabherwal, S. "Knowledge management using information technology: Determinants of short-term impact on firm value," Decision Sciences (36:4), Dec 2005, pp 531-567.

Schultze, U. "A confessional account of an ethnography about knowledge work," MIS Quarterly (24:1), Mar 2000, pp 3-41.

Scott, J.E. "Facilitating interorganizational learning with information technology," Journal of Management Information Systems (17:2), Fal 2000, pp 81-113.

Scott, J.E. "Organizational knowledge and the Intranet," Decision Support Systems (23:1), May 1998, pp 3-17.

von Krogh, G. "The communal resource and information systems," Journal of Strategic Information Systems (11:2), Jun 2002, pp 85-107.

Waters, J. "Achieving innovation or the Holy Grail: managing knowledge or managing commitment?" International Journal of Technology Management (20:5-8) 2000, pp 819-838.

Winter, S.G., and Szulanski, G. "Replication as strategy," Organization Science (12:6), Nov-Dec 2001, pp 730-743.

Sunday, July 24, 2011

By Margith Agnes Strand/ Fielding Graduate University/ July 24, 2011

Time, Space and Place in Distance Learning

The philosophy of Kant (Kant, 1781) will be visited to explore the enunciations of “space, time and being” in that “space” is seen as an objective which in turn places “meaning” as a construct of distance education. “Space” in distance education can be seen as a component of the dimensions of the transcendental arena; Words are a matter of form; the dimensions of the transcendental arena are what hold the incentive and the intuitive definition of the backbone of the field of distance education. “Space” is an expansive modular state of knowledge and understanding. Time is a realm of quantification which is process-related in the tenure of application and effort. Place is also a quantifier in a traditional sense, and yet, for our effort it is a realm of understanding and cognitive quantification in that it is synonymous with “word.” “Place is the word” and in it, the place is a symbol, as the word is a symbol that holds the sense of comprehension which reaches beyond the quantification aspect of the word, into the meaning and expression into the structure of a person’s life structure. Without the breadth and the brevity that the transcendental dimensions show, we as educators have no hold on the knowledge and the basis of the information that the various fields extend to the scope of education as a whole.

Logical Learning Theory: A Human Teleology and Its Empirical Support. Contributors: Joseph F. Rychlak - author. Publisher: University of Nebraska Press. Place of Publication: Lincoln, NE. Publication Year: 1994. Page Number: 36.

Behavior as Telosponsive

As a Kantian formulation, LLT takes its stance introspectively, from the point of view of the human organism whose behavior we want to explain. To be a genuine human teleology, LLT must be able to show how it is possible for the person to act for the sake of alternative meanings at any time, regardless of the number of past stimulations or inputs that may be dictating one and only one course of movement. We can achieve this if we take the Kantian spectacles of Figures 10 and 11 (chapter 1) as representing the native (innate, natural, etc.) logical process of cognition (mentation, reason, thought, etc.). We require a technical concept to subsume this introspectively framed schematization. The technical concepts of stimulus-response or input-output are of no help here, because they are extraspective formulations modeled solely on efficient causation. If psychology must rely exclusively on such language, it will never entertain a human teleology. My suggestion is, therefore, to think of human behavior in formal- and final-cause terms as telosponsive ( Rychlak, 1987 ). A telosponse is the affirmation or taking of a position regarding a meaningful content (image[s], word[s], judgmental comparison[s], etc.) relating to a referent acting as a purpose for the sake of which behavior is then intended. Affirmation encompasses predication.

We must understand telosponsivity exclusively from an introspective perspective in which meaning extends as behavior unfolds. We are looking through the "conceptual eyes" of the behaving person at this point. If there is no meaning involved, then there is no telosponsivity involved. The position affirmed by a person in telosponding may be termed a premise when it is the initiating precedent of a line of thought. Such affirmed meanings are then extended sequaciously as thought progresses. Affirmation is therefore the psychic equivalent of drawing a Euler circle within which a narrower range of meaning is targeted for meaning-extension. A familiar example of affirmation is "All human beings are mortal," but affirmations of meaning are not limited to complete verbal expressions like this. An affirmation can involve a single word, as when we target a certain word by its predicating definition in a dictionary. Such meaning can also be assigned to a fragment of a word or to any symbolically captured image. Images in motion can also be affirmed meaningfully, as when we imagine ourselves doing something we have never before attempted. Evaluations that contrast the relative merit of one targeted item over another also reflect the affirmations of telosponsivity.

From:Uses of 'Structure' in Communication Studies. Contributors: Richard L. Conville - editor. Publisher: Praeger Publishers. Place of Publication: Westport, CT. Publication Year: 1994. Page Number: 125.

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYMBOL MODEL FOR COMMUNICATION THEORY: LANGUAGE AS CONSTITUTIVE ARTICULATE CONTACT

John Stewart

Perhaps the most basic structural a priori of communication theory is the distinction between communication and what it is about, between words and the world, between map and territory, between symbol and symbolized. Almost no understanding of communication seems more obvious than that there is a fundamental, ontological difference between communication and its content or subject matter. One of the most prominent manifestations of this structural presupposition is the symbol model, the general characterization of language or communication as a semiotic process centrally involving "signs," "signals," and, especially, "symbols" or "symbolizing." The symbol model is manifested most clearly in the claims that language is "a conventional, arbitrary symbol system" ( Burke, 1978, p. 809; cf. Osgood, 1980) and that "[c]ommunication by means of symbols . . . is one of the singularities of humankind" ( Elias, 1991, p. 4; cf. Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1951; Rommetveit, 1968). This model implicitly or explicitly pervades a great deal of classical and contemporary communication theorizing and research.

But the adequacy and coherence of the symbol model have been directly challenged. For example, Martin Heidegger ( 1971) maintained that although "the entire structure of sign relations . . . has remained the standard for all later considerations of language" (p. 97), "the essential being of language is Saying as Showing," and that "its showing character is not based on signs of any kind" (p. 123). Hans-Georg Gadamer ( 1989a) agreed when he critiqued the semiotic "concept of language that modern linguistics and philosophy of language take as their starting point" because it inadequately captures "the language that lives in speech" (pp. 403-404). He emphasized that from his perspective language "is no longer a system of symbols or a set of rules of grammar and syntax ( Gadamer, 1984, p. 63) and that "as long as [language] is even conceived as a

From: Situated Cognition: Social, Semiotic, and Psychological Perspectives. Contributors: David Kirshner - editor, James A. Whitson - editor. Publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Place of Publication: Mahwah, NJ. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: 37.

Cognition, Context, and Learning: A Social Semiotic Perspective

Jay L. Lemke

City University of New York Brooklyn College School of Education

SITUATING COGNITION

We blame the early Moderns of Rene Descartes' 17th-century Europe for cleaving Mind from Body and Society from Nature (e.g., Latour, 1993; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). From them, we inherited a chain--cognition in the mind, mind "in" a material brain, brain in a mindless body, body in a natural environment separate from society, society made up of persons not bodies, persons defined by cultures, cultures created by minds--a chain that binds us still and runs us around and around in ever smaller circles.

We rebel, we transgress. We want the freedom to construct a materiality of mind, an intelligence of the body. We want meaning to arise from material processes and Culture to be once again a part of Nature. We want to resituate cognition in a larger meaning-making system of which our bodies and brains are only one part. We are willing to pay the price, to abdicate our Lordship over Creation, to become part-ners rather than over-seers. Creation, after all, has been getting pretty unruly anyway.

We are not the first rebels. Peirce (see Buchler, 1955; Houser & Kloesel, 1992; and Whitson, chapter 7, this volume) wanted to fuse Logic and Nature into a single system of meaning-making processes: a natural semiosis, a semiotic Nature. Bateson ( 1972) followed the chain of differences that make a difference outward from the mind-brain into the motor-body that wielded the cultural tool that engaged the material environment that reacted back on the tool, changing the dynamic state of nerves, muscles, heart rate, adrenalin,

From:Situated Cognition: Social, Semiotic, and Psychological Perspectives. Contributors: David Kirshner - editor, James A. Whitson - editor. Publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Place of Publication: Mahwah, NJ. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: 18.

The answers may be sought through discussion of two theories of learning, characterized as "the culture of acquisition" and "understanding in practice." The first theory proposes that learning is a naturally occurring, specific kind of cognitive functioning, quite separate from engagement in doing something. Educational institutions such as schools are assumed to function by specializing in learning. Teachers and curricula concentrated on teaching make it possible to intensify learning processes and to make explicit and specific the content to be learned. School students are considered to differ only by being better or worse at "getting it."

"The culture of acquisition" also refers to the practice of social scientists who think that culture is "something to be acquired." This view is based on contemporary assumptions about culture as an accumulation of factual knowledge (e.g., D'Andrade, 1981; Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). There is a further assumption that cognitive benefits follow only when the process of learning is removed from the fields in which what is learned is to be applied. This belief underlies standard distinctions between formal and informal learning, so-called context-free and context-embedded learning, or logical and intuitive understanding. Schooling is viewed as the institutional site for decontextualizing knowledge so that, abstracted, it may become general and hence generalizable, and therefore transferable to situations of use in the "real" world. Bartlett ( 1958) talks about freeing learners from the shackles of immediate time and place. This view is reflected in the removal of children's activities into the school, the transmission of information verbally and "from the top down," and tests as the measure of knowledge. Another major theme in this approach is the conception of the teaching/learning process as one of cultural transmission. This implies that culture is a body of knowledge to be transmitted, that there is no learning without teaching, and that what is taught is what will be learned (if it gets learned).

From: Logical Learning Theory: A Human Teleology and Its Empirical Support. Contributors: Joseph F. Rychlak - author. Publisher: University of Nebraska Press. Place of Publication: Lincoln, NE. Publication Year: 1994. Page Number: 93.

In fact, we are unable to control or manipulate logical processes in the same way that we control processes in the (efficiently caused) biophysical realm. Predicated meanings (contents) can be supplanted, but the precedentsequacious force of deduction, inference, and so on (process) is not amenable to controlled direction in the way that we drive our automobiles about or take medications to correct a physical ailment. Kahneman and Tversky ( 1972 ; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982 ; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983 ) have shown that although people rarely make decisions in the way that logicians, mathematicians, or statisticians do, and although they can easily be led astray by irrelevancies when predicating, there is nevertheless a detectable rulelike order taking place in their erratic and unsound course of mentation (see also Nisbett & Ross, 1980 ).

The grounds may shift, and the person may forgo a rigid rule in preference of a more flexible semantic formulation; for example, subjects are seen to solve word analogies by means of heuristics rather than inflexible algorithmic rules ( Sadler & Shoben, 1993 ). There is nevertheless a controlling order in such cognition, representing a psychical (Logos) rather than a physical (Physikos / Bios) determinism. Psychical determinism can be of the "hard" variety, of course, meaning that it is just as intractable as a physical determination (see Rychlak, 1988, p. 245 ). The concept of will reflects this hard determinism, and, as I noted in chapter 2, a free will notion combines the capacity to select the grounds ("freely") for the sake of which an action is then necessarily carried out ("willfully").

Further and...

http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/herbort_ma.pdf

Further....

Unformatted Document Text: Kinsella / Environmental Risk Communication Extended Abstract 4/30/07 Reconceptualizing Environmental Risk Communication: Toward a Critical, Constitutive Framework Extended Abstract Revised 30 April 2007 This essay develops a critical, constitutive framework for the analysis of environmental risk communication, incorporating perspectives from communication theory and from European sociology. In offering this framework I seek to expand the role of communication theory in a field that comprises a multiplicity of competing, and often theoretically impoverished, models of communication. As an explicitly critical approach, the framework emphasizes the inherently political aspects of risk communication and related issues of organizational and institutional power. It does so by adopting a constitutive model of risk communication, in contrast to prevailing representational, informational, and persuasive models. In order to move beyond unelaborated claims that risks are constituted through discourse, I link phenomenologically-grounded, constitutive theories of communication (e.g., Anton 1999; Deetz, 1973, 1992; Stewart, 1972, 1986, 1995, 1996) with the risk society perspective of Ulrich Beck (1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, 1999) and the functional systems theory of Niklas Luhmann (1989, 1990, 1993). Although the communication discipline has recognized the general relevance of Luhmann’s work, and to a lesser extent Beck’s, and those authors have written extensively on issues of ecology, risk, trust, and power, the connections between communication theory and their perspectives on ecology and risk have not yet been adequately explored. 1 To help facilitate that exploration, this essay focuses on the discursive constitution of environmental risks, understood as a specific category within the broad and amorphous field of risk communication. This analytical focus distinguishes environmental risks within a wider domain of discursive objects such as personal health risks (e.g., diet, sex, smoking), safety and property risks (e.g., accidents, crime, natural disasters), economic and financial risks (e.g., entrepreneurship, insurance, investments), and the many other personal, social, and institutional risks that Beck and others (e.g., Adam, Beck, & Van Loon, 2000; Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Franklin, 1998; Giddens, 1990; Lash, Szerszynski, & Wynne, 1996; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006) have identified with contemporary conditions. I must stress, however, that this distinction is artificial and temporary; in Luhmann’s terms it is a binary, operational code adopted for the critical purposes of this essay. Although the distinction is intended to select a relatively coherent range of phenomena or topoi for examination, one of my primary analytical premises is that environmental risks are connected to broader social and institutional patterns and must be understood in those terms. Although several authors have focused on environmental risk using concepts adapted from Beck (e.g., Cohen, 2000; Marshall, 1999; Pidgeon, Simmons, & Henwood, 2006; Rutherford, 1999), here I seek to add to those analyses by comparing, contrasting, and when possible, integrating Beck’s perspective with Luhmann’s and with constitutive communication theory. Ecological Communication, Crisis, and Kairos Both Beck (1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, 1999) and Luhmann (1990, 1993) have argued compellingly that risk has become a pervasive, general organizing principle within contemporary society. In Beck’s formulation, the familiar social, economic, and political problems associated

Theories of Small Group Communication July 24, 2011

THEORIES OF SMALL GROUP COMMUNICATION

The majority of small group communication textbooks are grounded in systems theory. Although systems theory is a relatively intuitive way to explore small group processes, it does have some weaknesses. For example, systems theory tends to favor stability over change, so innovation is often characterized as a system anomaly rather than a normal part of group work. The emphasis on harmony in systems theory means that conflict must be presented as abnormal and destructive. Systems theory generally ignores issues of power and status that influence small group decision making, particularly when groups are embedded in larger organizations. So while systems theory encourages us to examine the ways in which group members and groups are inter-related, it ignores other aspects of small group communication that are equally as important. In this module we'll briefly examine other theories of small group communication.


The Importance of Theory
Theories influence the way we think, interpret our world, and the actions we take. We develop theories about our environment to help organize and interpret our experiences. For example, if our theory of communication is that communication is the transmission of information, then we'll study senders who present clear, concise, well-organized messages. If we think of communication as performance, then we'll be concerned with shared meanings, sensemaking, and the way people coordinate their actions. These two approaches to communication suggest that "communication" can be understood in different ways if it is studied through different theories.

Let's examine a hypothetical scenario. During a group meeting, the leader provides oral and written instructions for all group members, which tell them how to write their sections of the group's report. Half the group members follow the instructions completely, one-quarter follow some of the instructions, and the remaining members don't follow the instructions at all. With the communication as transmission model, we'd examine the leader's instructions for clarity, detail, and organization. Our goal would be to improve the instructions so all group members could follow them to the letter. Based on the communication as performance approach, we'd want to know how the leader and group members made sense of the meeting and the instructions. We might want to hear about stories the leader and group member told based on their experience. We would focus on the way group members go about coordinating their actions, and possibly work with the group to reflect on group member interaction.

No single, perfect, all-encompassing theory of small group communication exists. Each theory of small groups illuminates some features of communication while hiding others. Still, some theories have greater utility than others do because they provide more insight, more practical implications, and lead us to ask more interesting and creative questions about small groups. For example, early research on work groups in organizations used a machine metaphor to understand group processes. This research focused on the group's task and ignored interpersonal aspects of small group work. Yet, those interpersonal aspects influence the way group members go about accomplishing their tasks. Thus, the machine metaphor may help us develop an efficient assembly line for producing automobiles, but it won't help us understand why the line's team members sabotage each other's work.


Theories of Small Group Communication
This section of the website provides an overview of four theories of small group communication: Functional Theory, Symbolic Convergence Theory, Structuration Theory, and the Naturalistic Paradigm. The descriptions included here serve only as introductions to these theories of small group communication and are not meant to be comprehensive discussions. The reference and additional reading lists offer sources for you to further explore research theories of small group communication. The overview does not cover every theory of small group communication, but includes the more developed and researched approaches to small groups.

Structuration Theory from Theories of Small Group Communications

Structuration Theory
Structuration Theory distinguishes between systems, such as small groups, and structures, the practices, rules, norms, and other resources the system uses to function and sustain itself. When applied to small groups, Structuration Theory views small groups as systems that both produce structures and are produced by structures. This means that group members follow particular rules in their interactions that produce some sort of outcome. That outcome eventually influences the group's future interactions.

Structuration refers to the processes group members employ as they work together. Structures both produce a system (in this case, a group) and are outcomes of a system. For example, suppose a committee decides to meet every second Wednesday of the month from 2:30-4:00 p.m. This regular meeting is a rule ("The committee will meet every second Wednesday of the month from 2:30-4:00 p.m.") that the group produced (and is thus an outcome of group interaction) as well as an instrument for producing the group. Other structures include methods of voting, norms of interaction, leadership styles, decision-making procedures, and rules for distributing the group's workload.

According to Structuration Theory, group members interact according to particular rules, and those group members also produce those rules through their interactions. This suggests that group members can negotiate group structures, yet at the same time, their interactions are constrained by those structures. For example, group members may decide to take turns leading each group meeting. The group member in charge of a particular meeting constructs and distributes the agenda, reminds others of the meeting, and makes arrangements for the meeting room. However, if the group found this structure was not working (e.g., group members forgot when it was their turn to lead the meeting), members could consider changing their procedures. Still, group member interactions may be constrained by the original structure, particularly if members A and B fulfilled their leadership duties and members C, D, and E did not.

Structuration theorists are interested in the way group members enact structures in their interactions. So structuration researchers observe group interaction directly. Researchers have examined the way group members' attitudes affect the structuration process, the influence of different types of structures on group decision-making and problem-solving, institutional constraints on group structures, and appropriated structures (those taken from other sources, such as majority rule in voting) and those that are unique to the group.

One strength of Structuration Theory is that it examines structures in action by focusing on the structuring process. Thus, attention is on small group interaction and how group members appropriate, adapt, create, and maintain rules and resources. Second, Structuration Theory is applicable to a variety of small groups, not just those that perform decision-making and problem-solving functions. In this way, Structuration Theory can help us understand an array of small groups, from corporate committee to self-help groups. Third, Structuration Theory takes into account environmental forces that may impinge on group processes.

It has its strengths, but Structuration Theory suffers from several weaknesses as well. First, Structuration Theory to date has not provided a way of predicting which circumstances will result in the development of particular structures. That is, Structuration Theory is largely descriptive in nature. Second, because structures are both system producers and the outcome of systems, it is difficult to research structuration in small groups. Researchers must examine group member communication as they put structures into action, as well as the structure that arises from that interaction. Third, the very definition of structuration implies that group structures change over time. Yet, it is often difficult to pinpoint which structural changes occurred and when by examining group interaction on a day-to-day basis. Last, research in Structuration Theory relies primarily on case studies. Structuration Theory can be adapted to individual cases, but because it is flexible, it is difficult to make generalizations based on Structuration Theory.

Symbolic Convergence Theory July 24, 2011 from Theories of Small Group Communications

Symbolic Convergence Theory is very different from the Functional Theory of group communication. One strength of symbolic convergence theory is the focus on group identity and the development of group consciousness. This theory is descriptive rather than predictive. Symbolic Convergence Theory helps us understand how group members interact and provides a way of examining small group culture. We can also determine who is a group member and who isn't depending on whether they are familiar with the group's fantasy themes, inside jokes, and rhetorical vision. Finally, Symbolic Convergence Theory is useful for examining groups in organizations because is provides a useful way to compare them; similarities and differences in the rhetorical visions and fantasies of small groups are often significant.

Constitution of Society: Outine of Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens July 24, 2011: Some Remarks Selected by Margith Strand

From: Constitution of Society by Anthony Giddens

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984 ~ Extracts and Annotations

A few remarks are necessary about the 'theory' in social theory. There are certain senses often attributed to 'theory' in the social sciences from which I want to maintain some considerable distance. One conception used to be popular among some of those associated with the orthodox consensus, although it is no longer widely held today. This is the view -- influenced by certain versions of the logical empiricist philosophy of natural science -- that the only form of 'theory' worthy of the name is that expressible as a set of deductively related laws or generalizations. This sort of notion has turned out to be of quite limited application even within the natural sciences. If it can be sustained at all, it is only in respect of certain areas of natural science. Anyone who would seek to apply it to social science must recognize that (as yet) there is no theory at all; its construction is an aspiration deferred to a remote future, a goal to be striven for rather than an actual part of the current pursuits of the social sciences.

Although this view does have some adherents even now, it is far removed from anything to which I would hold that social theory could or should aspire -- for reasons which will emerge clearly enough in the body of the book which follows. But there is a weaker version of it which still commands a very large following and which invites rather longer discussion even in this prefatory context. This is the idea that the 'theory' in social theory must consist essentially of generalizations if it is to have explanatory content. According to such a standpoint, much of what passes for 'social theory' consists of conceptual schemes rather than (as should be the case) 'explanatory propositions' of a generalizing type. {pp. xvi-xviii}

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Most of the controversies stimulated by the so-called 'linguistic turn' in social theory, and by the emergence of post-empiricist philosophies of science, have been strongly epistemological in character. They have been concerned, in other words, with questions of relativism, problems of verification and falsification and so on. Significant as these may be, concentration upon epistemological issues draws attention away from the more 'ontological' concerns of social theory, and it is these upon which structuration theory primarily concentrates. Rather than becoming preoccupied with epistemological disputes and with the question of whether or not anything like 'epistemology' in its time-honoured sense can be formulated at all, those working in social theory, I suggest, should be concerned first and foremost with reworking conceptions of human being and human doing, social reproduction and social transformation. Of prime importance in this respect is a dualism that is deeply entrenched in social theory, a division between objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism was a third -ism characterizing the orthodox consensus, together with naturalism and functionalism. In spite of Parsons' terminology of 'the action frame of reference', there is no doubt that in his theoretical scheme the object (society) predominates over the subject (the knowledgeable human agent). Others whose views could be associated with that consensus were very much less sophisticated in this respect than was Parsons. By attacking objectivism -- and structural sociology -- those influenced by hermeneutics or by phenomenology were able to lay bare major shortcomings of those views. But they in turn veered sharply towards subjectivism. The conceptual divide between subject and social object yawned as widely as ever.[3]